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implications represents the culmination of years of learning. I owe much to a collection 
of mentors, both official and unofficial, that is too great in number to list here. Similarly, 
the number of people who supported me emotionally and spiritually through this multi-
year effort is too great to include in full. That said, a handful deserve special recognition. 
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support, understanding, wisdom, patience, flexibility, and motivation. I hold gratitude to 
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psychological research at a time when the field had yet to fully acknowledge a need for 
such work, and for her mentorship, modeling, and advocacy in this realm. Dr. Eric Russ 
deserves credit for introducing me to the field of trauma psychology and psychotherapy, 
and for encouraging me to expand my understanding of the multitude of ways in which 
trauma impacts a survivor. I also want to thank my mentors at Cambridge Hospital / 
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diverse community played in this dissertation. In addition to all that the community has 
done for me personally, the power and beauty of trans and gender diverse people has 
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wanted to give up on this project, trans and gender diverse folks’ stories and spirit 
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analyzed for this dissertation are the lived experiences of trans people, the majority of 
whom are strangers to me, who volunteered their time and emotional labor to contribute 
to the literature. Reflecting on and reporting one’s psychological suffering is an 
incredibly difficult task that should not be treated casually, especially given the field of 
psychology’s history of pathologizing gender diversity and the possible negative 
associations and memories participants may have with the tasks I asked of them. I want to 
particularly recognize the efforts of participants who sit at the intersections of oppression 
– trans people of color, trans immigrants, trans people with severe mental illness and 
chronic illness or disability.  Additionally, it must be said that most of what I have 
“found” and discussed in academic and clinical language in the next hundred or so pages 
are truths that have long been spoken by trans people but fallen on transphobic and 
cissexist ears. I am proud of the work I have done, but I also wish it were not as 
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necessary. I want to state clearly that the research findings in this dissertation are less 
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Transgender people’s increased risk for negative mental health outcomes, when 
compared to cisgender peers or the general public, has been well documented in the 
psychological literature. Researchers have begun to establish empirical support for a 
relationship between anti-transgender bias, non-affirmation of gender identity, 
internalized transphobia, and other transgender-specific minority stressors. Although little 
work has explored the mechanisms of this relationship, some psychologists have 
proposed conceptualizing these factors as potentially traumatic experiences and 
understanding the poor mental health outcomes as manifestations of complex post-
traumatic stress. In this dissertation, I examine whether there is empirical support for this 
framework by evaluating the relationships between anti-transgender bias experiences, 
non-affirmation, internalized transphobia, and severity of symptoms of post-traumatic 
disorder. In Chapter 1, I review the literature on transgender mental health and conduct 
an in-depth exploration of the field of trauma psychology, offering critical reflections on 
the history of the field as well as the current etiological models of post-traumatic stress, 
while considering how these might apply to transgender mental health. Drawing 
primarily from feminist and multicultural theories of trauma, as well as theories of 
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shame-based post-traumatic stress, I develop a theoretical framework supporting my 
model in which: a) non-affirmation and anti-transgender bias experience are related to the 
severity of PTSD symptoms, and b) this relationship is mediated by experiences of 
internalized transphobia. In Chapter 2, I discuss the methodology I utilized to assess my 
research questions, noting recruitment strategies, psychometric properties of measures I 
selected, and appropriateness of the analytic method of structural equation modeling. In 
Chapter 3, I present the results, which include the main findings that all hypothesized 
relationships were found to be significant: greater levels of non-affirmation and exposure 
to anti-transgender bias were related to greater levels of PTSD symptom severity, both 
indirectly through internalized transphobia and directly. In Chapter 4, I discuss my 
findings in the context of my theoretical framework and literature review, offer clinical 
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STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM & REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
Transgender people1 are individuals whose gender identity does not fully align 
with the sex they were assigned at birth (APA, 2015). Transgender people are frequently 
victims of anti-transgender bias (Mizock & Lewis, 2008), and these experiences are 
associated with a host of negative mental health outcomes, including depressive 
symptoms, anxiety, suicidality, and post-traumatic stress (e.g., Bockting, Miner, 
Swineburne Romine, Hamilton, & Coleman, 2013; Clements-Nolle, Marx, & Katz, 2006; 
Friedriksen-Goldsen et al., 2014; Shipherd et al., 2014). Conceptualizing anti-transgender 
bias experiences as trauma is helpful in understanding the relationships between such 
experiences and transgender people’s mental health (Richmond, Burnes, & Caroll, 2012), 
and research has documented that transgender people who have experienced more 
perceived discrimination report greater PTSD symptom severity than those who 
experienced less perceived discrimination (Reisner et al., 2016). No research, however, 
has explored the possible mechanisms between these bias events and PTSD symptoms. A 
clearer understanding of how anti-transgender bias events operate as potentially traumatic 
events and lead to post-traumatic stress is needed to help clinicians better promote 
psychological health and wellbeing in transgender clients (Richmond et al., 2012).
																																																								
1 Although I will be discussing transgender people using third person, I want to 
acknowledge that I do in fact identify as transgender and belong to this community. 
			 2	
Building upon the Minority Stress Model (Hendricks & Testa, 2012; Meyer, 2003), 
multiple theories of trauma (e.g., Bryant-Davis & Ocampo, 2005; Foa & Cahill, 2001; 
Root, 1992), and work on shame and internalized stigma (e.g., Tangney & Dearing, 
2002), I will examine the relationships between anti-transgender bias events, internalized 
transphobia, and PTSD symptoms.  
In this chapter, I provide the foundation for my proposed model of anti-
transgender bias-based PTSD, drawing from psychological theory, empirical evidence, 
the voices of transgender people, and history. First, I provide an introduction to 
transgender people by briefly defining transgender identity, then exploring the literature 
on transgender mental health and experiences. Second, I introduce a broad conceptual 
framework through which we can understand transgender people’s trauma. I do this by 
reviewing the history of the psychological study of trauma and exploring multiple 
modern conceptualizations of trauma, while identifying how transgender people’s trauma 
experiences fit within current models. Third, I examine the role of shame and internalized 
stigma in trauma. Finally, I review literature on transgender people’s shame experiences 
(specifically, internalized transphobia), and propose the previously unstudied role of 
these shame experiences in transgender people’s development of post-traumatic distress. 
The Experiences and Mental Health of Transgender People 
A transgender person is an individual whose gender identity is different from the 
sex they were assigned at birth. Gender identity is a deeply held, internal sense of one’s 
gender, while sex assignment that occurs at birth is typically based on genitalia (APA, 
2015). Having a gender identity that differs from one’s sex assignment is not rare, though 
it is uncommon. Most recent estimates of the proportion of United States residents who 
identify as transgender place the number at .6% (Flores, Herman, Gates, & Brown, 2016), 
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meaning 1.4 million Americans identify as transgender. The actual figure is likely to be 
larger (Meier & Labuski, 2013). The term transgender is typically considered an umbrella 
term that includes a range of gender identities and expressions. Importantly, gender 
identity is increasingly understood as a nonbinary construct, meaning that someone may 
identify their gender as falling along a continuum between man or woman, or as an 
alternative gender unrelated to the categories of man and woman (APA, 2015).  
Transgender people may be more likely to seek psychotherapy than non-
transgender (also referred to as cisgender) people (Carmel, Hopwood, & dickey, 2014). 
This increased need for services is likely due to multiple factors: First, historically, 
transgender people were required to seek mental health evaluation and treatment to be 
approved for transition health care (Hopwood & dickey, 2014); second, transgender 
people may utilize psychotherapy to aid in their identity development/acceptance work 
(Bockting & Coleman, 2008); and third, transgender people are more likely than the 
general population to struggle with their mental health (Carmel, Hopwood, & dickey, 
2014). 
Research on transgender people’s mental health illustrates that transgender people 
face great risk for mental health and psychological difficulties. Studies have found rates 
of psychiatric diagnoses in transgender samples that are significantly higher than those 
found in epidemiological studies of the general population (e.g., Hepp, Kraemer, 
Schnyder, Miller, & Delsignore, 2005; Terada et al., 2012). The largest known study of 
transgender people’s mental health, using online data collection, found that in a sample of 
over one thousand transgender women and men, 44% met criteria for clinically 
significant depression, 33% for clinically significant anxiety, and 38% for somatization 
(Bockting, Miner, Romine, Hamilton, & Coleman, 2013). In a separate study, when a 
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sample of transgender2 women and men were compared with matched non-transgender 
controls, transgender people showed increased psychopathology (measured by the 
Symptom Check List-90-Revisited Instrument; SCL-90-R) both when compared to non-
transgender controls of the same gender and when compared to non-transgender controls 
of the same sex assigned at birth (Auer et al., 2013). Transgender people consistently 
demonstrate levels of anxiety and depression symptoms that are greater than those found 
in the general population (e.g., Budge, Adelson, & Howard, 2013), and are more likely 
than the general population to meet the criteria for post-traumatic stress disorder (PSTD; 
Shipherd et al., 2014). In comparisons to the general population, studies have also 
demonstrated increased suicidality in transgender populations (e.g., Blosnich et al., 2013; 
Haas, 2014), increased self-harm behavior (dickey, Reisner, & Juntunen, 2015), and 
increased interpersonal difficulties (Davey, 2015). One study has contradicted these 
findings and reported that the differences in current symptomology and diagnoses 
between transition-seeking transgender people and non-transgender people were only 
small, though statistically significant, and may not represent meaningful difference 
(Fisher et al., 2012). The study was conducted at a gender transition clinic, and the 
authors explained their unexpected findings as a consequence of the defensiveness that 
transgender people present with when seeking transition-related healthcare. Indeed, 
transgender people wary of losing access to a gender transition often downplay 
psychiatric symptoms and psychological distress (Hopwood & dickey, 2014), which 
suggests that data collected in this manner are less likely to yield reliable results and lead 
																																																								
2 Auer et al. (2013) referred to their participants as transsexuals; their use of that label 
was motivated by the fact that these individuals had a diagnosis of Gender Identity 
Disorder (which has been updated and replaced by Gender Dysphoria), not participants’ 
self-identification with the “transsexual” label. Transgender is the more appropriate 
terminology for such individuals and the use of this term does not alter their conclusions. 
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to valid conclusions. There are two main sources of the documented mental health 
disparities transgender people face: gender dysphoria and anti-transgender bias (Carmel, 
Hopwood, & dickey, 2014).  
Gender Dysphoria 
Gender dysphoria is the distress that some transgender people experience due to 
the incongruences between their body and their gender identity and between others’ 
perceptions of their gender and their gender identity (APA, 2015). Treatment for gender 
dysphoria involves social and/or medical gender transitions to reduce the felt 
incongruence. Transgender people consistently report that transition reduces their gender 
dysphoria and related psychological distress (Erickson-Shock, 2015). Empirical evidence 
supports this: in the only longitudinal study currently published, a sample of transgender 
men showed significant declines in MMPI-2 psychopathology within the first year of 
testosterone treatment (Keo-Meier et al., 2015). Cross-sectional studies have also found 
that individuals who are further progressed in their transition have better mental health 
and psychological functioning (e.g., Barr, Budge, & Adelson, 2016; Budge et al., 2013). 
Anti-transgender Bias 
Anti-transgender bias is a common, but harmful experience for transgender 
people (Bockting et al., 2013). Transgender people are likely to have experienced 
discrimination or rejection due to being transgender or gender nonconforming, and a 
large proportion of transgender people experience harassment and violence that stem 
from their gender identity or presentation (Bazargan & Galvan, 2012; Bradford, Reisner, 
Honnold, & Xavier, 2013; Dispenza, Watson, Chung, & Brack, 2012; Grant et al., 2011; 
Mizock & Lewis, 2008). Anti-transgender bias is also experienced as non-affirmation of 
a transgender person’s gender identity, which could include “assuming a person’s 
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assigned sex at birth is fully aligned with that person’s gender identity, not using a 
person’s preferred name or pronouns, asking [transgender or gender nonconforming 
people] inappropriate questions about their bodies, or making the assumption that 
psychopathology exists given a specific gender identity or expression” (APA, 2015, p. 
10; Nadal, Rivera, & Corpus, 2010; Nadal, Skolnik, & Wong, 2012). Experiences of bias 
and stigmatization are associated with a range of negative mental health outcomes, 
including general psychological distress, suicidality, and self-injury (Bockting et al., 
2013; dickey, Reisner, & Juntunen, 2015; Goldblum et al., 2012; Nuttbrock et al., 2010; 
Testa et al., 2012; Testa et al., 2015). Transgender individuals who face greater 
discrimination also report greater levels of PTSD than transgender people who face less 
discrimination, even after controlling for exposure to traditionally defined traumas 
(Reisner et al., 2016). 
The negative impact of anti-transgender bias on transgender people’s mental 
health is currently understood through Hendricks and Testa’s (2012) adaptation of the 
Minority Stress Model (Meyer, 2003). Anti-transgender bias that is experienced as an 
external event is conceptualized as distal minority stress. Hendricks and Testa (2012) 
defined four types of distal minority stressors for transgender people: gender-related 
discrimination, gender-related rejection, gender-related victimization, and gender-related 
non-affirmation. These stressors lead to increased psychological distress. Distal minority 
stressors also increase a person’s experience of internal or more proximal minority 
stressors (Meyer, 2003), which Hendricks and Testa (2012) defined for transgender 
people as internalized transphobia, expectation of discrimination and rejection in future 
events, and nondisclosure (or concealment of transgender identity or history). The 
Minority Stress Model theorizes that proximal minority stressors partially mediate the 
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relationship between distal minority stressors and mental health outcomes (Hendricks & 
Testa, 2012; Meyer, 2003). Research documenting a relationship between trans-specific 
proximal stressors and psychological distress has provided support for this theory (Testa 
et al., 2015). Of all the proximal stressors, internalized transphobia is the best understood, 
and is reviewed later. 
Trauma and PTSD 
A disparity also has been documented with regard to prevalence of post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD). In a study of transgender adults who were male assigned at birth, 
17.5% of the full sample endorsed DSM-IV PTSD symptoms at a clinically significant 
level (Shipherd, Maguen, Skidmore, & Abramovitz, 2011). This proportion is markedly 
larger than the DSM-IV PTSD prevalence rates of the general population (5% to 10%; 
Kessler et al., 1995). The same study found a high rate of exposure to traditionally 
defined trauma: 98% of participants had experienced at least one potentially traumatic 
Criterion A event (PTE), as measured by the commonly-used Traumatic Life Events 
Questionnaire (TLEQ; Kubany et al., 2000), and 91% reported having experienced 
multiple PTEs. The overall trauma exposure rate in this sample is higher than that of the 
general population (e.g., Breslau, 1998), but transgender people’s exposure to 
interpersonal violence is particularly high. Estimates of the proportion of transgender 
people who have experienced physical assault range from 25% to 51% (Nuttbrock et al., 
2010; Shipherd et al., 2014; Testa et al., 2012). Estimates of the proportion of transgender 
people who have been the victims of sexual assault range from 6% to 27% (Shipherd et 
al., 2014; Testa et al., 2012).3 Transgender people’s increased exposure to violence is 
																																																								3	Note that the research on trauma exposure and PTSD prevalence in transgender 
populations has utilized disproportionately White samples; transgender people of color 
experience more bias and may have even higher rates of exposure to PTEs and bias-
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often due to anti-transgender bias. Forty-two percent of Shipherd and colleague’s (2014) 
transgender sample reported that at least one of their traumatic experiences was due to 
anti-transgender bias, and male-assigned-at-birth participants who more often presented 
as women were more likely to be victimized compared to those who presented as women 
less often. More than 50% of Nuttbrock and colleagues’ (2010) sample reported a history 
physical abuse that was directly related to the participant’s gender identity or 
presentation. In addition to being associated with PTSD symptoms in transgender 
populations (Reisner et al., 2016; Shipherd et al., 2014), experiences of bias-related 
interpersonal trauma are also related transgender people’s depression and suicidality 
(Clements-Nolle, Marx, & Katz, 2006; Nuttbrock et al., 2010).  
Recall that the aforementioned study by Reisner and colleagues (2016) found that 
after controlling for experiences of traditionally-defined traumas, such as interpersonal 
violence, greater levels of discrimination were associated with increased severity of 
PTSD symptoms in a transgender sample. Recently, psychologists have proposed 
understanding transgender people’s exposure to anti-transgender bias through a 
conceptual framework rooted in trauma theory (Richmond, Burnes, & Carroll, 2011). 
Richmond and colleagues argued that anti-transgender discrimination and other bias-
related experiences are forms of insidious trauma (Root, 1992) that can be considered 
experiences of violence; such experiences should thus be considered within a context of 
all the violence by which transgender people are victimized. Under this framework, 
transgender people’s increased rates of psychopathology are the result of symptoms of 
traumatization. Beyond Reisner and colleagues’ (2016) study linking discrimination 
																																																								
related PTEs, as well as higher rates of severe PTSD symptomology than their White 
peers (Mizock & Lewis, 2008).	
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experiences with transgender people’s PTSD symptom severity, no known research has 
tested this trauma-based framework. 
Defining Trauma and Conceptualizing Post-Traumatic Stress 
 Understanding transgender people’s experiences of anti-transgender bias through 
a trauma framework requires a thorough understanding of trauma theory, the historical 
origins of such theory, and current debate over the definition of trauma and etiology of 
post-traumatic stress.  
Historical Context (Prior to DSM-III) 
Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is a modern construct and diagnosis, having 
first appeared in the American Psychiatric Association’s (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1980) third edition of its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-III). Trauma’s impact on human behavior and psychological 
functioning, however, is documented well before the DSM-III. To understand the current 
challenges in defining PTSD and traumatic events, one is aided by understanding the 
history of trauma psychology; this history highlights the instability of the construct, as 
well a pattern of mistakes on the part of mainstream science and medicine, namely in 
attempts to define survivors’ experiences for them (Herman, 1992). It will become 
particularly clear as the history is reviewed that it was not until the survivors of trauma 
had the power to speak out and be listened to that advancements in humane and effective 
research and treatment were actually made. As will be discussed later, in recent years, 
psychologists from marginalized communities (e.g., people of color, women, queer, 
transgender psychologists) have developed a substantial body of theory and empirical 
evidence supporting an expansion of trauma to include bias events (e.g., Bryant-Davis & 
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Ocampo, 2005). Little of this work has been incorporated into mainstream trauma 
teaching, research, or treatment.   
Railway accidents. Trauma first entered the literature of Western medicine in the 
latter half of the 19th century, amidst a decades-long wave of devastating railway 
accidents (Weisath, 2014). Surgeons who treated passengers injured in these crashes and 
derailments noted symptoms that matched what we today might expect from a trauma 
survivor. However, in attempts to distinguish male railway accident survivors from 
“weak” females suffering from hysteria, some surgeons proposed that accident victims’ 
behavioral symptoms were the result of a physical “shock to the system,” which resulted 
in a spinal concussion (Erichsen, 1866). Other surgeons challenged this position, 
attributing emotional disturbances to “mental shock” or “fright” (Page, 1883, p. 169). In 
her study of the history of trauma psychology, Herman (1992) noted that this question of 
whether the origin of trauma victims’ symptoms was physical or psychological would 
reemerge in the field’s subsequent efforts to treat hysteria and war neuroses. 
Hysteria. Historians often attribute the “birth of trauma” and its study (Fassin & 
Rechtman, p. 30) to the study of hysteria (e.g., Libbrecht & Quackelbeen, 1995; Van Der 
Kolk, 2007; Weisaeth, 2002). By the late 19th century, the commonly acknowledged 
forefathers of psychology were working in Europe to comprehend the broad category of 
emotional and behavioral disturbances labeled hysteria. Jean-Martin Charcot had made 
his career recording the symptoms and physical characteristics of female hysterics (as 
they were called at the time; Weisaeth, 2014). Toward the end of his career, Charcot, 
inspired by the work with male railway accident survivors, began studying so-called male 
hysterics and proposed an etiological link between trauma experiences and dissociation 
and other behavioral symptoms (Charcot, 1887, as cited in Van Der Kolk, 2007).  
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Charcot’s students expanded this understanding of trauma and applied it to females with 
hysteria symptoms. Herman (1997) asserted that famed psychologists Janet, Freud, and 
Breuer, made the first documented efforts to speak with women suffering from hysteria 
as a method of empirical research. In doing so, they all came to the conclusion that the 
origin of female hysterics’ suffering was traumatic memories, referred to by Janet (1984, 
as cited in Van Der Kolk, 2007) as subconscious fixed ideas and by Freud and Breuer 
(1895) as reminiscences. Freud (1896) specifically attributed the development of hysteria 
to repressed memories of childhood sexual abuse. As these men provided some 
temporary validity to the suffering of hysterics, more women came forward with 
symptoms of hysteria. Letters from Freud suggest that he was overwhelmed by the 
number of women suffering and found it beyond belief that the violations he had believed 
to be the source of hysteria could be so commonplace (Herman, 1997). Van der Kolk 
(2007) also noted that new leaders in medicine at the turn of the century were dismissive 
of the theories positing psychical trauma as a possible origin of hysteria. Freud and his 
peers accordingly moved away from their initial understanding of hysteria, and the 
emerging field of psychology adopted a view of women’s mental illness framed by 
assumptions of malingering, false memories, and subconscious desires to be victims of 
sexual trauma (Freud, 1925; Westerland, 1986). Scientists and physicians lost interest in 
hysteria, and it would be more than half a century before the field recognized the validity 
of these women’s suffering and the sources of such suffering (Burgess, 1983; Herman, 
1992; Westerland, 1986). 
War neuroses, the antiwar movement, and combat trauma. World War I 
brought a renewed focus to trauma. During the war, medics in the military could not 
make sense of the overwhelmingly large number of soldiers experiencing combat-related 
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syndromes. Initially, these syndromes were described as physical in nature. As the 
psychic nature of soldiers’ conditions started to become unavoidable, the phrase “war 
neuroses” became commonplace (Weisaeth, 2002; 2014). However, because injuries of 
the psyche were considered within a person’s control (at least to an extent far beyond 
bodily injuries), the adaptation of a psychological model of war neuroses meant that those 
suffering were viewed with contempt (Herman, 1997; Van der Kolk, 2007). They were 
considered moral invalids and leading psychiatrists employed and promoted ‘treatment’ 
grounded in shaming, threatening, and punishing (Leri, 1918). For example, in his then-
considered-seminal text, Hysterical Disorders of Warfare, military psychiatrist Yealland 
(1918) documented the use for electric shock for treating what we would call 
psychosomatic symptoms, recommended that those whose ‘nervousness’ or ‘depression 
of spirits’ prevented them from returning to combat be court martialed, and described 
techniques that involved yelling at patients for being cowardly and lazy during hours-
long sessions. W. H. R. Rivers is credited with shifting the approach to treating sufferers 
of war neuroses; he famously “cured” veteran Siegel Sassoon by kindly inviting him to 
talk about his experiences. However, the war soon ended and the veterans with 
psychological problems, considered a national embarrassment and still often thought of 
as weak-willed and unmasculine, spent the rest of their lives in mental institutions 
(Herman, 1997).  
Little record of work on war neuroses in the literature exists between WWI and 
WWII (Weisaeth, 2014). The exception was psychiatrist Kardiner, who was troubled by 
his field’s approach to combat veterans, particularly after the war. Dismayed, he left the 
field to study anthropology. With the return of war and with a heightened understanding 
of the impact of context on an organism, Kardiner returned to the study of war neuroses. 
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He famously published a book in which he demonstrated that combat-induced mental 
illness was not due to weak will or poor character and could in fact happen to anyone 
(Kardiner, 1941; Van der Kolk, 2007). Military psychiatrists used Kardiner’s work as a 
jump-off point and began investigating how to prevent men in combat from developing 
war neuroses. Research was also conducted on how to quickly treat these neuroses in a 
way that allowed for swift return to the front lines (Van der Kolk, 2007; Weisaeth, 2014). 
But again, the war ended and little attention was paid to the psychological impact of war 
for many years. There was some research in Europe on the psychological syndromes seen 
in Holocaust survivors (e.g., Krystal, 1968, 1978, 1988, as cited in Van der Kolk, 2007), 
but this too was short-lived and received almost no attention from American 
psychologists (Weisaeth, 2014). Even as psychological scientists and practitioners were 
beginning to establish the validity of psychological sources of suffering and the normalcy 
of stress responses to traumatic events, this work was done solely within the context of 
war traumas and for the purpose of finding and developing better fit soldiers. 
An important shift in the way psychologists and American culture at large 
understood trauma occurred when veterans advocacy groups, not military physicians or 
great psychological thinkers, took the lead. As part of the anti-war protest efforts in the 
1970s, Vietnam veterans began speaking publicly about the emotional and psychological 
impact the war had on them (Weisath, 2014). In addition to forcing public discourse on 
the far-reaching psychological effects of combat trauma, members of the group Vietnam 
Veterans against the War also organized grassroots treatment efforts. These veterans 
gathered in small rap groups, where they would process combat experiences and their 
difficulties returning to civilian life. They often invited progressive psychiatrists or 
psychologists to observe or facilitate the groups, and these clinicians noted the benefit of 
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the groups and their apparent success in helping veterans cope with the trauma they had 
experienced (Herman, 1997). Growing public pressure, built and sustained by veterans’ 
organizing efforts, their collaborations with psychologists and psychiatrists, and other 
antiwar movement work, to assist in veterans’ recovery meant an increase in funding and 
research. This ultimately culminated in the proposal of a diagnosis for the DSM-III. The 
initial proposal, however, focused exclusively on war trauma (Herman, 1992). 
Women’s liberation and rape/abuse trauma. The fact that the field of 
psychology now understands PTSD as a somewhat broad diagnostic category inclusive of 
a variety of types of trauma, rather than a diagnosis specific to combat trauma, is largely 
due to the efforts of activists from the Women’s Liberation Movement and female 
researchers and practitioners. While Vietnam veterans were using protest strategies to 
highlight the horrors of war abroad, women activists in the 1960s and 70s were 
organizing to raise awareness of the horrors of what Herman (1997) calls “the sex war” 
(p. 92): rape and other sexual victimization. Groups such as the National Organization for 
Women aimed to open the public’s eyes to the commonality and devastating impact of 
rape by organizing speak-outs and rallies. This growing public conversation about rape 
and the increasing power of women in the social sciences coalesced, and for the first 
time, researchers began systematically studying the effects of rape on women. Ann 
Burgess and Lynda Holmstrom, a psychiatric nurse and a sociologist, respectively, 
published the first known results of such a study and determined that survivors of abuse 
often had similar symptoms and difficulties. They termed this “rape trauma syndrome” 
(Burgess & Holmstrom, 1974). As researchers and practitioners began to legitimate the 
histories and suffering of women and children, more survivors came forward, and more 
research followed. The National Institutes of Mental Health opened a center for rape 
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research, and lines of academic inquiry were opened into the effects of domestic violence 
and incest (Herman, 1997; Van der Kolk, 2007). In addition to identifying the 
commonalities between survivors of these types of violence, researchers noted the 
similarities in symptoms and behaviors between survivors of “civilian” violence and 
combat survivors. This work culminated in psychology’s first general category of trauma 
and its psychological impact on human behavior and psychological functioning. Bringing 
the field of trauma psychology almost full circle, researchers at this time also noted the 
similarities between the historic cases of hysteria and the sexual trauma survivors 
diagnosed with PTSD (Herman, 1997). Nearly a century later, “hysterics” were 
recognized as traumatized individuals whose psychological distress and so-called 
abnormal behavior was retroactively acknowledged as valid human responses to their 
trauma (Burgess, 1983). 
This history is critical to understanding current work in trauma psychology 
because it highlights the instability within the development of PTSD as a diagnostic label 
and psychological construct. Importantly, this history provides evidence that necessary 
growth toward more accurate and more helpful understandings of trauma and its impact 
have come from listening to survivors and outsiders.  
In this paper, I will ultimately present a conceptualization of anti-transgender bias 
experiences as traumatic. Mainstream psychology currently lacks a frame for 
understanding how minority and stigmatized people are affected by oppression. Without 
proper attention to oppression-related factors, the psychological community misdiagnoses 
such individuals; this not only inappropriately pathologizes already stigmatized people, it 
also prevents appropriate intervention and allows mainstream society to ignore the impact 
of oppression (Brown, 2008; Herman, 1997). Much like the trauma theory advances in 
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history, attending to the experiences of transgender people is likely to help move 
clinicians and researchers’ understanding of trauma forward. 
Modern Understandings of Trauma and Post-Traumatic Distress 
Although the introduction of PTSD into the DSM-III established the validity and 
non-rarity of negatively impactful responses to trauma, the DSM-III did not solidify 
PTSD as a static construct. Over the past three decades, psychologists have proposed and 
explored multitudes of definitions and theories of trauma and post-traumatic stress. Each 
revision to the DSM has included partial revisions to PTSD’s diagnostic criteria 
(Friedman, 2014). Today, the field of psychology remains far from consensus on both the 
diagnostic criteria of PTSD and a model of etiology (Friedman, Resick, Bryant, & 
Brewin, 2011). In the following review of the field’s current approaches to 
conceptualizing trauma and post-traumatic distress, I include discussion of the current 
diagnostic criteria in the DSM-5, as well as prominent theories of trauma from cognitive-
behavioral, feminist, and multicultural psychologists. I also discuss the applicability of 
each approach to understanding transgender people’s experiences of trauma and 
psychopathology. 
Diagnostic criteria and associated debate. PTSD is listed in the current edition 
of the APA’s (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) DSM-5 under Trauma- and 
Stressor-Related Disorders, a category that is new to this edition (Friedman, 2014). Full 
diagnostic criteria are presented in Table 1. The criteria require that a person, older than 
age 6, have been exposed to actual or threatened death, serious injury, or sexual violence 
(Criterion A), and that following such exposure, they have experienced intrusion 
symptoms, persistent avoidance, negative alterations in cognitions and mood, and marked 
alterations in arousal and reactivity for at least one month; the disturbance must cause 
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clinically significant distress or impairment and cannot be attributable to substance use or 
a medical condition. Though there remains debate about many components of the DSM-5 
criteria (see Friedman et al., 2014a for review), the most prominent debates surround 
Criterion A, or what is considered trauma exposure. 
Table 1 
DSM-5 Diagnostic Criteria for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
Note: The following criteria apply to adults, adolescents, and children older than 6 
years. 
A. Exposure to actual or threatened death, serious injury, or sexual violence in one 
(or more) of the following ways: 
1. Directly experiencing the traumatic event(s). 
2. Witnessing, in person, the event(s) as it occurred to others. 
3. Learning that the traumatic event(s) occurred to a close family member or close 
friend. In cases of actual or threatened death of a family member of friend, the 
event(s) must have been violent or accidental. 
4. Experiencing repeated or extreme exposure to aversive details of the traumatic 
event(s) (e.g., first responders or collecting human remains; police officers 
repeatedly exposed to details of child abuse) 
Note: Criterion A4 does not apply to exposure through electronic media, 
television, movies, or pictures, unless this exposure is work related. 
B.  Presence of one (or more) of the following intrusion symptoms associated with the 
traumatic event(s), beginning after the traumatic event(s) occurred: 
1. Recurrent, involuntary, and intrusive distressing memories of the 
traumatic event(s). 
Note: In children older than 6 years, repetitive play may occur in which 
themes or aspects of the traumatic event(s) are expressed. 
2. Recurrent distressing dreams in which the content and/or affect of the 
dream are related to the traumatic event(s). 
Note: In children, there may be frightening dreams without 
recognizable content. 
3. Dissociative reactions (e.g., flashbacks) in which the individual feels or 
acts as if the traumatic event(s) were recurring. (Such reactions may 
occur on a continuum, with the most extreme expression being a 
complete loss of awareness of present surroundings.) 
Note: In children, trauma-specific reenactment may occur in play. 
4. Intense or prolonged psychological distress at exposure to internal or 
external cues that symbolize or resemble an aspect of the traumatic 
event(s). 
5. Marked physiological reactions to internal or external cues that 
symbolize or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event(s). 
C. Persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the traumatic event(s), 
beginning after the traumatic event(s) occurred, as evidenced by one or both of 
the following: 
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1. Avoidance of or efforts to avoid distressing memories, thoughts, or 
feelings about or closely associated with the traumatic event(s). 
2. Avoidance of or efforts to avoid external reminders (people, places, 
conversations, activities, objects, situations) that arouse distressing 
memories, thoughts, or feelings about or closely associated with the 
traumatic event(s). 
D. Negative alterations in cognitions and mood associated with the traumatic 
event(s), beginning or worsening after the traumatic event(s) occurred, as 
evidenced by two (or more) of the following: 
1. Inability to remember an important aspect of the traumatic event(s) 
(typically due to dissociative amnesia and not to other factors such as 
head injury, alcohol, or drugs). 
2. Persistent and exaggerated negative beliefs or expectations about 
oneself, others, or the world (e.g., “I am bad,” “No one can be trusted,” 
“the world is completely dangerous,” “My whole nervous system is 
permanently ruined”). 
3. Persistent, distorted cognitions about the cause or consequences of the 
traumatic event(s) that lead the individual to blame himself/herself or 
others. 
4. Persistent negative emotional state (e.g., fear, horror, anger, guilt, or 
shame). 
5. Markedly diminished interest or participation in significant activities. 
6. Feelings of detachment or estrangement from others. 
7. Persistent inability to experiences positive emotions (e.g., inability to 
experiences happiness, satisfaction, or loving feelings). 
E. Marked alterations in arousal and reactivity associated with the traumatic 
event(s), beginning or worsening after the traumatic event(s) occurred, as 
evidenced by two (or more) of the following: 
1. Irritable behavior and angry outbursts (with little or no provocation) 
typically expressed as verbal or physical aggression toward people or 
objects. 
2. Reckless or self-destructive behavior. 
3. Hypervigilance. 
4. Exaggerated startle response. 
5. Problems with concentration. 
6. Sleep disturbance (e.g., difficulty falling or staying asleep or restless 
sleep). 
F. Duration of the disturbance (Criteria B, C, D, and E) is more than 1 month. 
G. The disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impairment in social, 
occupational, or other important areas of functioning. 
H. The disturbance is not attributable to the physiological effects of a substance 
(e.g., medication, alcohol) or another medical condition. 
Specify whether: 
With dissociative symptoms: The individual’s symptoms meet the criteria for 
post-traumatic stress disorder, and in addition, in response to the stressor, the 
individual experiences persistent or recurrent symptoms of either of the 
following: 
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1. Depersonalization: Persistent or recurrent experiences of feeling 
detached from, and as if one were an outside observer of, one’s mental 
processes or body (e.g., feeling as those one were in a dream; feeling a 
sense of unreality of self or body or of time moving slowly). 
2. Derealization: Persistent or recurrent experiences of unreality of 
surroundings (e.g., the world around the individual is experienced as 
unreal, dreamlike, distant, or distorted). 
Note: To use this subtype, the dissociative symptoms must not be 
attributable to the physiological effects of substance (e.g., blackouts, 
behavior during alcohol intoxication) or another medical condition (e.g., 
complex partial seizures). 
Specify if: 
With delayed expression: If the full diagnostic criteria are not met until at 
least 6 months after the event (although the onset and expression of some 
symptoms may be immediate). 
 
It is made clear by both the name of the disorder itself (post-traumatic stress 
disorder) and its diagnostic criteria (Criterion A, specifically) that the symptoms 
described in Criterions B, C, and D only constitute PTSD if the affected individual 
experienced a traumatic event. Since the inception of the diagnosis (and arguably before, 
though with different goals), researchers and practitioners have been debating where to 
draw the lines around what constitutes a traumatic event vs. a non-traumatic event 
(Weisath, 2014). In the DSM-IV, Criterion A was divided into A1 (which described 
necessary characteristics of an event: involving “actual or threatened death or serious 
injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of self or others;” APA, 2000) and A2 (which 
described necessary emotional responses to the event: fear, helplessness, or horror). The 
task force charged with updating the diagnostic criteria for the DSM-5 removed the A2 
criterion in the face of clear evidence that PTSD routinely develops in individuals who 
did not experience an A2-qualifying emotional response at the time of the traumatic event 
(Friedman & Resick, 2014).  
The task force also considered removing the A1 criterion in recognition of 
evidence that individual differences in psychological vulnerabilities leads to differences 
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in perception of whether or not an event is life-threatening. A1 criterion was ultimately 
retained, with researchers citing McNally’s (2009, as cited in Friedman & Resick, 2014) 
conclusion that “the memory of the trauma is the ‘heart of the diagnosis’ and the 
organizing core around which the B-F symptoms [intrusion symptoms, avoidance 
symptoms/behaviors, negative alterations in mood, alterations in arousal, and a duration 
of at least one month] can be understood” (p. 23). The language in Criterion A was 
slightly expanded, but largely upheld Weathers and Keane’s (2007) argument that a 
traumatic event entails “personal involvement with, if not direct exposure to catastrophic 
life events” (p. 115, as cited in Friedman & Resik, 2014, p. 23). Much research, however 
contradicts the task force’s assumption that a ‘catastrophic life event’ must be one that 
involves “exposure to actual or threatened death, serious injury, or sexual violence” in 
very specific ways (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Many researchers have 
found associations between exposure to non-Criterion A events and increased PTSD 
diagnoses and/or symptomatology, even after controlling for the experience of Criterion 
A events (e.g., Carlson & Dalenberg, 2000; Gold et al., 2005; Long et al., 2000; Mol et 
al.,2005; Van Hooff, 2009). As I will discuss later in my review of feminist and racism-
based theories of trauma, an important area of research of the validity and 
appropriateness of Criterion A has examined the traumatic nature of incidents that are 
racist, misogynist, and otherwise oppressive. Many trauma psychologists have called on 
expansion of Criterion A to include prejudice events (e.g., Sanchez-Hucles, 1998). This is 
key for understanding many of transgender people’s trauma experiences, as the insidious 
trauma of anti-transgender bias does not qualify as a Criterion A trauma but has been 
linked with PTSD symptoms and poor mental health (Bockting et al., 2013; Reisner et al., 
2016). 
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Additionally, feminist psychologists and supporters of other non-mainstream 
conceptualizations of trauma are critical of the entire notion that characteristics of an 
event should determine whether or not it qualifies as potentially traumatic. In summary of 
work by Allen (1996), Briere (2004), and Bryant-Davis and Ocampo (2005), Helms, 
Nicolas, and Green (2010) stated that for certain events, “it is the victimized person’s 
subjective interpretation of the events that they experienced rather than the objective 
reality or physical properties of the event that determine whether it is traumatic” (p. 54). 
These theorists argue that the survivor’s perception of an event and its impact on them 
are what is most important to the event’s classification as traumatic or non-traumatic. The 
exact same event may be traumatic for one person and not for another. It should also be 
noted that some theorists whose work is discussed in this dissertation would object to the 
validity of even delineating specific diagnostic criteria. This objection is, in part, due to 
differences in fundamental approaches to making sense of human behavior and the 
impact of trauma, as well as the development of so-called psychopathology. These 
differences will be made clear in the following review of etiological theories. 
Psychological theories of trauma. As stated earlier, the 1980 introduction of 
PTSD as a diagnosis represented a shift in the psychological community toward 
recognition of the symptoms of post-traumatic stress as valid and even normal human 
responses to trauma. However, while these PTSD responses are common, they are not 
universal. The etiological links between trauma exposure and PTSD and other trauma-
related disorders are not direct; research even suggests that the majority of people 
exposed to trauma have never met the criteria for a PTSD diagnosis. Researchers 
attempting to estimate prevalence rates in the United States have found that between 37 
and 92% of respondents had been exposed to trauma, with the wide range being largely 
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due to differences in sample (Breslau, 1998). Recent epidemiological studies have 
estimated the lifetime prevalence of PTSD (utilizing DSM-5 criteria) as 6.1% (Goldstein, 
2016). Even if that proportion is expanded to include subthreshold PTSD (with an 
average estimated prevalence rate of 12.6%; Branco, 2016), these results indicate that 
natural recovery from trauma exposure without ever developing PTSD is possible. 
Clearly, factors beyond trauma exposure alone play contributing roles in the development 
of PTSD. Many etiological theories have been postulated to explain these mechanisms 
behind PTSD development following trauma exposure.  
In this section, I review the two most prominent mainstream models of PTSD 
etiology: conditioning and emotion processing theories. I also discuss feminist theories of 
trauma and theories of racist-incident based trauma in depth; Richmond and colleagues’ 
trauma framework for understanding transgender mental health and experiences of 
oppression is rooted in this work. This section also includes a brief review of schema 
theories of trauma, as these lay the foundation for the feminist trauma theories.  
Conditioning models. Etiological theories of PTSD that involve conditioning 
focus on fear and anxiety and have their origin in Mowrer’s (1960) two-factor theory. 
This theory proposed that anxiety develops through two factors: classical conditioning 
and operant conditioning; this idea was revolutionary during an era when psychologists 
were in the habit of pledging allegiance to either classical condition or operant 
conditioning as their school of psychology (Monson, Friedman, & La Bash, 2014). 
Mowrer (1960) proposed that classical conditioning explained how individuals initially 
developed a fear response to seemingly non-threatening stimuli, but that operant 
conditioning explained how this was maintained, due to relief experienced by avoiding 
the conditioned stimuli. Kilpatrick, Veronen, and Resick (1979) were the first to apply 
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the two-factor theory to the development of post-traumatic stress. They theorized that 
stimuli present during the traumatic event elicit fear-based cognitive, emotional, 
physiological, and behavioral responses when encountered in subsequent non-traumatic 
situations due to classical conditioning. These stimuli can be external (e.g., the sound of 
explosions at a fireworks show, sexual touch in consensual situations) or internal (e.g., 
cognitive representations of the traumatic event or conditioned external stimuli, emotions 
or physiological sensations that the survivor had also experienced during the trauma). 
Additionally, the fear response may be generalized and extend to stimuli that are only 
similar to those that were present during the traumatic event. Kilpatrick and colleagues’ 
(1979) expansion of the two-factor theory proposed that the post-traumatic stress 
symptoms developed through classical conditioning are then sustained and promoted 
through avoidance, which is learned via operant conditioning – and specifically negative 
reinforcement: When individuals are presented with a trigger, they engage in avoidance, 
which temporarily removes the trigger; this results in immediate relief, reinforcing the 
pattern of avoidance.  
 The foundation laid by Kilpatrick et al. (1979) has remained largely unaltered in 
subsequent conditioning-based discussions of the acquisition and maintenance of PTSD 
(e.g., Keane, Zimering, & Caddell, 1985; Kilpatrick, Veronen, & Best, 1985). Recent 
expansions of the two-factor conditioning model have focused on deficits in the ability to 
extinguish fear responses. Models of conditioned fear response have been the basis of 
exposure-based treatments for phobias and other anxiety disorders, as well as PTSD. 
Theoretically, if stimuli can be conditioned to produce a fear response, the same stimuli 
can be reconditioned to produce a neutral response, thus extinguishing the fear response, 
or leading to fear extinction (Gillihan et al., 2014). That repeated exposure to anxiety-
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causing stimuli can decrease an individual’s emotional response to them is well-
documented in the literature. People with PTSD, however, show significant deficits in 
fear extinction (Lissek et al., 2009). Research has also found that people with PTSD have 
difficulty recalling fear extinction responses (neutral responses to conditioned stimuli) in 
some circumstances even after they have demonstrated this learned extinction response in 
other circumstances. Milad and colleagues (2008, 2009) proposed this deficit is in recall 
of the learned extinction response. According to this theory, individuals with deficits in 
learning or recalling extinction responses may come to rely on avoidance techniques to 
manage their fear response, so avoidance and fear extinction deficits work in tandem to 
maintain and promote PTSD symptoms (Gillihan et al., 2014). 
 Using conditioning to understand PTSD development has its shortcomings. This 
model is an extension of general anxiety models, and as Gillihan and colleagues (2014) 
pointed out in their critique, does not explain empirical evidence that shows differences 
between phobias and PTSD (e.g., increased generalization of stimuli, poorer response to 
treatment). Additionally, it is unclear from these models and current research whether 
difficulty with fear extinction deficits are due to pre-existing psychological vulnerabilities 
or result from the trauma experience itself. Gillihan and colleagues (2014) also argued 
that while deficits in fear extinction explain subsequent and chronic triggering 
experiences in individuals with PTSD, they need to be reconciled with fairly robust 
literature demonstrating the efficacy of exposure-based treatments in reducing PTSD 
symptoms. Finally, these models do not address the increasing body of literature 
supporting the DSM-5’s expanded conceptualization of PTSD as more than an anxiety 
disorder, which includes symptoms beyond those explained by fear response.  
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Still, conditioning theories are helpful in understanding the fear-based PTSD 
symptoms transgender people experience in response to bias events (Reisner et al., 2016). 
Trauma responses to seemingly non-threatening bias-based stimuli could be characterized 
as generalizations of conditioned responses, if a person has previously been exposed to 
similar bias events in the context of threatening situations (as is a frequent experience for 
many transgender people; e.g., Grant et al., 2011; Shipherd et al., 2014). Additionally, if 
a key part of the reduction of post-traumatic stress is the learning and recall of fear 
extinction responses (Lissek et al., 2009), the frequency of bias-based threatening 
situations alone would interfere with transgender people’s recovery and thus encourage 
further generalization of conditioned responses. 
 Emotional Processing Theory. Emotional Processing Theory (Foa & Cahill, 
2001; Foa & Kozak, 1985, 1986) is an etiological theory of PTSD that shares similarities 
with conditioning models, but can account for non-fear-based cognitions, emotions, and 
other symptoms. Foa and Cahill’s (2001) model of PTSD posits that the symptoms of 
PTSD represent activations of maladaptive emotion structures that were developed during 
the trauma experience and then maintained and expanded through subsequent activations. 
According to this theory, emotion structures are memory structures that “include 
emotion-related stimuli, responses, the meanings associated with these stimuli and 
responses, and the associations among these representations” (Gillihan et al., 2014 p. 169. 
These are typically adaptive and include scripts for appropriate (and sometimes life-
saving) actions. Scripts are a type of schema structure that include behavioral and social 
responses to stimuli (Foa & Cahill, 2001). Maladaptive structures develop due to 
inaccurate associations between responses, or understandings of stimuli that do not reflect 
reality. Emotional Processing Theory suggests that there are two principal components to 
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the maladaptive emotion structures underlying PTSD: a fear structure that has 
generalized to include non-threatening stimuli; and an emotion structure that includes the 
individual’s response to the trauma and a sense of incompetence in protecting themselves 
from harm. They described these structures as leading to “two broad sets of negative 
cognitions: ‘the world is entirely dangerous’ and ‘I am completely incompetent’” 
(Gillihan et al., 2014, p. 170). The emotion structure can include the feelings of shame 
that are also characteristic of many cases of PTSD, and which some psychologists 
proposed are an integral piece of the development and maintenance of post-traumatic 
stress (e.g., Lee et al., 2011).  
In addition to providing a broader understanding of the etiology of post-traumatic 
stress as a complex response to stimuli, emotional processing theory offers an 
explanation for the natural recovery often seen in survivors of trauma. Foa and Kozak 
(1986; Foa & Cahill, 2001) explained that emotional processing of trauma allows 
individuals to recover from the trauma without developing PTSD. This recovery occurs 
because in each experience of processing, survivors are exposed to evidence that 
disconfirms their negative cognitions about the world and themselves. According to this 
theory, PTSD develops when trauma survivors fail to process their traumatic memories 
adequately and instead strengthen their maladaptive emotion structures. Thus, beyond 
conceptualizing avoidance as a source of negative reinforcement for trauma responses, 
emotional processing theory views avoidance as an obstacle to the processing that is 
necessary for dismantling of maladaptive of emotion structures (Foa & Cahill, 2001). 
There is empirical evidence to support this theory. Gilboa-Schetman and Foa (2001) 
found that trauma survivors whose distress peaked three weeks or more after the trauma 
suffered from more severe PTSD symptoms months later when compared to survivors 
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whose distress peaked within the first two weeks of the trauma. Foa and colleagues 
(2007) developed prolonged exposure therapy (PE) to help clients with PTSD process 
their trauma memories and engage with evidence that disconfirms their beliefs about 
threats and their ability to handle them. PE has demonstrated considerable efficacy as a 
treatment (Powers, Halpern, Ferenschak, Gillihan, & Foa, 2010), lending strong empirical 
support to emotional processing theory. This work has considerably advanced the field’s 
understanding of trauma and trauma treatment (Gillihan et al., 2014), and provides a 
helpful framework for conceptualizing post-traumatic stress development in transgender 
people. It is particularly useful in its inclusion of non-fear-based cognitions and emotions 
within emotional structures that can be triggered by various stimuli. An emotion structure 
that has been strengthened by an anti-transgender trauma, for example, may include a 
bias event as a trigger, internalized transphobic cognitions and shame as internal 
responses, and certain PTSD symptoms and behavioral responses. 
The limitations of emotional processing theory revolve around its reliance on a 
clearly defined and singular trauma event. Additionally, Foa and colleagues’ concept of 
recovery from trauma and PTSD rests on a major assumption that survivors’ appraisals of 
the world and themselves are inaccurate and can be disconfirmed. These represent major 
limitations in the theory’s application to the traumatic experiences of transgender people, 
which are chronic in nature (Mizock & Lewis, 2008; Shipherd et al., 2014), and which 
stem from a climate that truly is unsafe for many transgender people (Grant et al., 2011). 
Additionally, although PE is one of the strongest evidence-based treatments 
available to individuals with PTSD, a substantial minority of those who receive treatment 
do not improve, and PE and other exposure treatments struggle with poor adherence and 
drop-out rates (Powers et al., 2010). The high rates of drop-out and poor adherence 
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suggest that there are individuals whose trauma has affected them in ways beyond the 
scope of this theory (Herman, 1992). 
Schema theories. Schema theories of PTSD originated from psychoanalytic and 
information processing schools of psychology (Gillihan et al., 2014). These 
psychological theories conceptualize PTSD as resulting from the cognitive dissonance 
and schema work that occurs following a trauma. Horowitz (1986) first proposed this 
approach to PTSD, arguing that traumatic events contradict survivors’ beliefs about 
others, the world around them, and/or themselves; he argued that this contradiction, or 
schema incongruence, itself was traumatic as a form of severe cognitive dissonance. 
Trauma theorists from this school specifically argue that traumas violate the following 
belief schemata: the world is benign and meaningful, the self is worthy, and people are 
trustworthy (Epstein, 1991). Horowitz (1986) argued that recovery from trauma involved 
making sense of the traumas by adapting the information about the trauma and one’s core 
schemas until they align with each other. This work borrowed heavily from Piaget’s long 
accepted theories about the use of cognitive assimilation and accommodation to relieve 
disequilibrium (Gillihan et al., 2014). Intrusion symptoms are the primary result of the 
dissonance, though avoidance symptoms may also arise from this schema incongruence 
(Horowitz, 1986). McCann and Pearlman’s (1990) schema-based conceptualization of 
trauma included many of Horowitz’s original ideas, but also highlighted trauma-related 
strengthening of pre-existing maladaptive schemas as an additional source of PTSD 
symptomology. They suggested that it was not just the experience of cognitive 
dissonance that was traumatizing, but that in attempting to make meaning out of a 
trauma, a survivor could reinforce unhelpful and unhealthy ideas about themselves and 
the world (e.g., that the world is unsafe, or that the self is devalued). In this instance, 
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schema congruence would be the mechanism behind PTSD development, particularly in 
negative alterations in mood and alterations in arousal. 
Gillihan and colleagues (2014) explained schema theories as sources of 
advancement in the field’s understanding of how trauma affects the way survivors make 
sense of the world and themselves. Trauma literature now readily recognizes that 
traumatic events can have profound impact on a person’s beliefs about the world 
(Gillihan et al., 2014). Indeed, one might note that Foa & Cahill’s (2001) ‘emotion 
structures’ are similar to the concept of schemas. Feminist trauma psychologists, 
psychologists studying racist-based trauma, and psychologists studying shame-based 
trauma also draw upon the tenets of Horowitz’s (1986) and McCann and Pearlman’s 
(1990) trauma theories. The theories’ strengths for these psychologists are in their 
emphases on the mental model of the event as the source of trauma. Schema theory, 
however, has significant gaps in explanatory power, most prominently that it is unclear 
when scheme incongruence is a risk factor for post-traumatic stress and when scheme 
congruence is a risk factor (Gillihan et al., 2014). Gillihan and colleagues (2014) are also 
critical of the theory for its difficulty to operationalize and test.  
Feminist conceptualizations and etiological theories. Feminist understandings 
of trauma and its impact rely upon key assumptions that run counter to the mainstream 
psychological approach to trauma and post-traumatic stress. Paramount among feminist 
assumptions of trauma is that “what is deemed traumatic is determined by the 
traumatized person rather than the observer” (Root, 1992, p. 230). By emphasizing the 
psychosocial context of individuals and the traumas they experience, feminist theories of 
trauma define trauma according to the impact an event has on a person, rather than solely 
by characteristics of the event itself. This perspective is a piece of the challenge to the 
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aforementioned debate about defining trauma events in Criterion A of the DSM 
diagnostic criteria for PTSD. The feminist theories discussed in this section appear to 
place little importance on strictly defining trauma and the sequelae following traumata, 
again challenging the approach taken by the DSM-5 and more mainstream trauma 
psychologists. Although aforementioned mainstream trauma psychologists such as Foa 
and Resick developed their theories and treatments with the stated purpose of creating 
measurable constructs (Resick et al., 2012), most feminist trauma psychologists explicitly 
state they are not concerned with developing or presenting a theory constructed for 
empirical testing, instead focusing on the at-times opposite goal of broadening our 
understanding of trauma and placing it within the context of human psychology in 
general (Root, 1992). 
Root’s feminist reconstruction of the impact of trauma. Maria Root’s (1992) 
seminal work on a feminist conceptualization of trauma, Reconstructing the Impact of 
Trauma on Personality, provided an alternative framework for understanding trauma. Her 
work draws from a transtheoretical core component of definitions of the impact of 
trauma: disorganization of the world and self. Citing emotional processing theory (Foa et 
al., 1989) and schema theory (Horowitz, 1976; Janoff-Bulman,1985), she described how 
traumatized individuals experience “a shattering or destruction of different constellations 
of organizing principles by which we come to know ourselves, others, and the world” (p. 
251). Root (1992) referred to these constellations of organizing principles as dimensions 
of security and theorizes that these security dimensions are physical, psychological, or 
interpersonal (see Table 2 for her description of some of the ways traumata affect these 
dimensions). Root suggested that every instance of destruction of an aspect of a 
dimension of security is a trauma, as it represents a sudden and dramatic disorganization. 
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Thus, a traumatic event is actually itself a constellation of multiple trauma experiences, 
the specific signature being determined by details of the traumatic event, the context of 
the event, and the person’s history and identity.  
Table 2 
Root’s (1992) Dimensions of Security 
Dimension Explanation 
Physical  
Stimulus deprivation Lack of stimulation, particularly early in life, may 
permanently alter or retard CNS development; stimulus 
input also provides a grounding in reality; SD includes 
restricted movement; confinement 
Pain Immediate CNS response, severe pain likely to leave 
‘memory traces’ 
Injury Almost always involves pain and may also be 
accompanied by visual cues (e.g., blood), auditory cues 
(e.g., screams, gunfire) 
Permanent injury Leaves indelible visual, functional, and/or kinesthetic 
reminder of trauma 
Starvation Also related to pain and associated with survival 
behaviors: hoarding, dreams about food, hallucinations, 
antisocial behaviors to obtain food 
Psychological/spiritual  
Confrontation with mortality Confront reality of fragility of life and reality of death 
Loss of significant other(s) Impairs sense of belonging, existence, identity, security 
Perceived malicious intent Raises fear, anticipation of harm; injure belief in 
benevolent action 
Isolation Alienation, lack of opportunity to test reality or assign 
appropriate cause/responsibility; contributes to feeling 
helpless and constructing idiosyncratic meaning 
Helplessness/loss of control Resignation, cessation of hope 
Witness/participant to death 
or destruction 
Human life not valued; right and wrong nonapplicable 
Crushing of spirit Emotional abuse, brainwashing, and destruction result in 
humiliation, perceived lack of meaning to one’s 
existences, lack of zest for life 
Dislocation Such as in refugee experience; loss of identity, 
homebase, country, culture, attachment – results in 
disorientation and being ungrounded 
Interpersonal  
Betrayal Devastates trust and willingness to be interpersonally 
vulnerable 
Abuse of power Fails to provide social order and assurance of safety; 
impairs trust 
Violation of personal space Damages sense of control over space; alters notion of 
inter- and intrapersonal boundaries 
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Rejection Devalues worth; negates existence; may contribute to 
deprivation in children 
Invisibility Ignores existence, devalues worth, sentence of “death” 
Loss of significant other(s) Impairs sense of belonging, intimacy, trust 
  
Note. Table from Root (1992, pp. 252-253) 
This reconstruction not only captures the multitude of ways that violence or threat 
of violence can affect a person, it also provides a framework for understanding how non-
physically threatening experiences can still be injurious in traumatic ways. For example, 
the chronic experience of anti-transgender discrimination could be conceptualized using 
Root’s (1992) security dimensions as destructive of psychological and interpersonal 
dimensions, resulting in “fear and anticipation of harm,” “perceived lack of meaning in 
one’s existence,” “devastat[ion] of trust and willingness to be personally vulnerable,” 
“devalue[d] worth,” and “impair[ed] sense of belonging,” (Root, 1992, pp. 252-253).  
Root referred to this type of non-physical, oppression-based trauma as insidious 
trauma. Insidious traumata include daily reminders to a person that their status is 
devalued in society due to an intrinsic characteristic (or group membership) that differs 
from the norms or values of those with more social power. In addition to insidious 
trauma, Root defined two other categories of trauma: direct and indirect. Her concept of 
direct trauma is the category most aligned with the mainstream definitions of trauma, 
though Root’s also included life-threatening illness, emotional abuse, and violence 
perpetrated against a community to which one belongs. For the latter, she offers an 
example of the trauma an indigenous person might experience due to their ancestors 
being dislocated and/or victims of genocide. At the time of Root’s work, indirect 
exposure to trauma was not considered by mainstream psychology to be traumatic in and 
of itself; this has since changed. The current Criterion A includes indirect exposure to a 
close family member or close friend’s trauma. Root’s concept of indirect trauma includes 
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being traumatized by trauma experienced by anyone “with whom one identifies in some 
significant way” (p. 239), thus expanding definitions of indirect trauma to include 
community members and those with similar identities, as well as therapists and others in 
helping positions who may be traumatized by the trauma sustained by their clients. 
Notably, this level of indirect traumatization is more and more accessible, as social media 
connections has intensified the ways in which people are exposed to community 
members’ trauma. 
Building upon schema theory, Root posited that the sequelae of trauma are the 
manifestation of an individual’s efforts to reorganize their security dimensions following 
traumata. Although many individuals who experience trauma re-establish a sense of 
themselves and a sense of the world that are not terribly different from what existed pre-
trauma, many survivors do not. Root (1992) explained many of the symptoms and 
behaviors associated with PTSD, as well as other trauma-related disorders such as 
borderline personality disorder, histrionic personality disorder, and depression, as 
evidence of reorganization that is “developmentally idiosyncratic and survival-oriented” 
(p. 255). According to Root, much of what is seen in trauma survivors’ presentations can 
be described within a framework of stages of vigilance and survival behaviors. Drawing 
from neurobiological evidence and decades of cognitive theory and research, Root 
explained that response to threatening cues occurs on three sequential levels or stages: 
readiness, alert, and survival. Readiness describes an ability to detect threatening sensory 
experiences, events, and people; it involves scanning behaviors, constant employ of 
working memory, and weak potentiation, meaning individuals in a readiness level are 
quicker to react to stimuli. Alert is a level of response to threatening cues, in which one’s 
energy and resources are directed toward the threat, but the individual is aware of their 
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heightened level of vigilance and is still able to engage in some metacognition to evaluate 
validity of the threat. Survival is the level of response in which an individual can no 
longer assess for the validity of the threat and as such responds to all possible threats as 
though they are truly threatening. The individual’s “perceptual, decisional, and relational 
process are transformed” by the redirection of all energy and focus to threat response 
(Root, 1992, p. 247).  
Root argued that the destruction of dimensions of security leave a trauma survivor 
in a constant state of readiness. The literature since Root produced this theory has 
supported her conclusions: trauma survivors displaying PTSD symptoms consistently 
show neuroendocrine and even structural brain abnormalities that lead to increased 
reactivity, near-constant threat monitoring, cognitive deficits associated with reallocation 
of resources, and difficulty with memory and present/past separation (e.g., Yehuda & 
LeDoux, 2007). Because of this heightened level of readiness and reactivity, as well as 
reorganization that may have prioritized survival, traumatized individuals are often 
operating from a survival mode. Root argued that many of the behaviors the field of 
psychology has at best labeled impairments or maladaptive functioning, and at worse 
described as regressive or unstable, are truly self-preservation behaviors in individuals 
who are understandably experiencing a near-constant state of threat. Much of the 
sequelae associated with post-traumatic stress disorder and trauma-related personality 
disorders can be described within Root’s categories of survival behaviors: self-
referencing behavior; egocentrism; preservation; anger; withdrawal and shutting down; 
and splitting. Recovery, be it ‘natural’ or treatment-aided, from post-traumatic distress 
thus occurs when an individual can reorganize their dimensions of security to better 
modulate their stages of vigilance, enact non-survival behavioral responses to possible 
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threats, and engage in flexibility around when to employ survival behaviors. Root argues 
that this is mostly possible only in the context of absence of trauma, but this is a 
necessary and not sufficient component of recovery. 
Insidious trauma may be particularly impactful in the development of 
idiosyncratic and survival-based security dimensions. Root (1992) and other theorists 
proposed that the traumatic effects of insidious trauma (chronic and sometimes subtle by 
their nature) may be the result of their role in gradual shaping views of the world and self, 
rather than the “shattering” of such schema or security dimensions that is attributed to 
single event traumas (Brown, 2008; Richmond et al., 2012). Additionally, the chronic 
level of threat inherent in insidious trauma prevents the development of non-survival 
behaviors and psychological flexibility required for recovery (Root, 1992). 
To provide further understanding as to why some trauma experiences are more 
likely lead to sustained disorganization or heightened levels of vigilance, Root (1992) 
also proposed a two-dimensional phenomenological categorization of traumatic events: 
by perceived intent (malicious or accidental) and perceived interpersonal context (in 
isolation or with companion(s)). The word “perceived” is important to the feminist 
framework Root is presenting, as “the intrinsic meaning of the event must be determined 
by the person experiencing it, rather than the observer” (Root, 1992, p. 243). 
Understanding where a trauma falls on these dimensions helps one understand how the 
trauma might affect certain security dimensions and subsequent reorganization. Most 
importantly, the more the intent behind a trauma is perceived to be malicious and the 
more the trauma survivor perceives themselves to be isolated, the more likely the 
survivor and others are to understand the trauma experience through a lens of unique 
vulnerability (Perloff, 1983, as cited in Root, 1992). This concept is akin to victim-
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blaming and self-blaming (Crawford, 1977; George & Martinez, 2002; Janoff-Bulman, 
1979). Unique vulnerability means that there is or was something about the survivor that 
made them fall victim to the traumatic event. Experiencing repeated or chronic traumas 
can reinforce a sense of unique vulnerability, both to external observers and to the 
survivors themselves. Root argues that a perception of unique vulnerability prevents 
trauma survivors from reconstructing their lives, seeking and receiving support, and even 
identifying the event as traumatic. This lack of progress occurs in part due to increased 
experiences of shame in survivors who have a sense of unique vulnerability (Brown, 
2008). Unique vulnerability also leads to an increased sense of persistent threat and 
reorganization that is necessarily survival-based. This might help explain the differential 
rates of persistent post-traumatic stress for events like rape versus natural disasters 
(Kessler, Sonnega, Bromet, Hughes, & Nelson, 1995); rape victims are more likely to be 
viewed as somehow contributing to their trauma (Brown, 2008), and may experience the 
consequences of unique vulnerability that Root (1992) theorized.  
Insidious traumata can be particularly devastating to the dimensions of perceived 
intent and perceived interpersonal context, as well as to the perception of a unique sense 
of vulnerability. Although insidious trauma can often be attributed to membership to a 
stigmatized/oppressed group, creating a sense of individual-level companionship in the 
trauma, Root (1992) described a concurrent experience of group-level isolation/alienation 
from mainstream society. The latter reduces the amount of support and resources 
available to survivors of insidious traumata. Additionally the targeting of an individual 
due to group membership can reinforce a complex sense of unique vulnerability. When 
trauma is perceived to be due to bias against an individual characteristic, it can be easy 
for others and the victim to hold the victim responsible (Brown, 2008). Because violence 
			 37	
and other anti-transgender bias are more likely when a transgender person presents as 
their authentic gender identity (e.g., a transgender woman who was male assigned at birth 
presenting in feminine clothing; Grant et al., 2011; Shipherd et al., 2014), transgender 
victims of anti-transgender bias-based trauma may be particularly susceptible to outsider 
projections and internalizations of unique vulnerability and accompanying shame 
(Brown, 2008). The chronic nature of insidious trauma further contributes to a sense of 
unique vulnerability (Comstock, 1989; Parson, 1985; Root, 1992).  
Root’s conceptualization of insidious trauma has had the largest impact on the 
field of trauma psychology. Her work has been the foundation for theory and research on 
racist incident-based trauma, homophobic/heterosexist incident-based trauma, and 
conceptualizing anti-transgender bias events as trauma (Bryant-Davis & Ocampo, 2005; 
Richmond et al., 2012; Szymanski & Balsam, 2011).  In the past two decades, 
psychologists looking at the impact of racism and the oppression of sexuality minorities 
(people who identify their sexuality as something other than heterosexual or straight) 
have drawn upon and expanded insidious trauma theory to explain increased rates of 
PTSD and trauma-related distress and diagnoses in minority communities. A large body 
of research has found that within the United States, people of color are more likely than 
White people to meet diagnostic criteria for PTSD (e.g., Roberts, Gilman, Breslau, 
Breslau, & Koenen, 2011). When compared to White people, people of color are more 
likely to develop PTSD in the aftermath of Criterion A PTEs, even those (e.g., natural 
disasters) that would be considered completely unrelated to a person’s racial and ethnic 
identities (e.g., Breslau, Cilcoat, Kessler, & Davis, 1999; Perilla, Norris, & Lavizzio, 
2002). Additionally, being victimized by a hate crime (a crime in which a person’s 
identity or identities are determined to be a motivating factor) is associated with greater 
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risk for PTSD (Herek et al., 1999). Psychologists have explained some of these findings 
by treating minority status as a risk factor due to the increased likelihood of acculturative 
stress, which may reduce a person’s ability to effectively cope with traumas (Kulkarmni 
& Pole, 2008). Others challenge this as the sole explanation and argue that racism and 
ethnoviolence are themselves insidious traumata and the actual sources of symptoms and 
behaviors associated with PTSD (Bryant-Davis & Ocampo, 2005; Helms, Nicolas, & 
Green, 2010; Loo et al., 2001). Research has supported this application of the concept of 
insidious trauma. Individuals who have more exposure to racist and ethnicity-based bias 
are more likely to experience PTSD when compared to individuals with less exposure to 
these biases, even after accounting for the effects of Criterion A PTEs (e.g., Chou, 
Asnaani, & Hofmann, 2012; Ellis, MacDonald, Lincoln, & Cabral, 2008). Paradies and 
colleagues’ (2015) meta-analysis, which included 16 studies that examined the 
relationship between racism and post-traumatic stress symptoms, found an effect size of r 
= .34 for racism on PSTD symptoms and diagnoses. Similar relationships with PTSD 
have been found with anti-woman bias experiences and sexual harassment (e.g., Eillness, 
Steel, & Lee, 2007; Kira, Smith, Lewandowski, & Templin, 2010), as well as anti-LGBQ 
bias experiences (e.g., Alessi, Martin, Akua, Gyamerha, & Meyer, 2013; Szymanski & 
Balsam, 2011). The limited research that has been done on transgender people’s 
experiences of bias and PTSD have also supported Root’s (1992) theory of insidious 
trauma. Reisner and colleagues (2016) found that transgender people who experienced 
more discrimination were more likely to have PTSD symptoms, even after controlling for 
exposure to Criterion A potentially traumatic events (PTEs).  
Complex PTSD. In the same year that Root introduced her reconstruction of 
trauma, Herman (1992) proposed her own alternative framework for understanding the 
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impact of interpersonal trauma: complex PTSD. Richmond and colleagues (2012) largely 
based their trauma framework for transgender mental health in this particular trauma 
theory. Herman (1992) critiqued the existing DSM criteria for defining trauma solely as 
single events and failing to capture the myriad ways that trauma can affect survivors, 
particularly when it is interpersonal, chronic, and cumulative. She proposed re-
conceptualizing post-traumatic stress disorders as existing on a continuum that ranges 
from the classic simple PTSD described in the DSM to complex PTSD, which develops in 
response to prolonged or repeated interpersonal trauma. By the nature of the trauma being 
chronic, survivors of repeated trauma are “in a state captivity, unable to flee, and under 
control of the perpetrator” (Herman, 1992, p. 377). Herman argued that this captivity and 
the related interpersonal dynamics and persistent threat to safety complicate the trauma 
experience and lead to a host of symptomatic and characterological trauma sequelae. The 
hypervigilance that is learned as a protective strategy during trauma extends beyond 
traumatic situations, and individuals with complex PTSD often present as anxious and 
constantly agitated at baseline, often without a perception of ever achieving calm; this 
leads to a host of somatization difficulties, which is supported by research that finds 
increased chronic physical health problems in survivors of complex trauma. Dissociation, 
which is often employed voluntarily as a tool to cope with trauma, becomes a process 
over which the survivor loses control. Herman (1992) cited research and theory that 
describes traditional dissociation symptoms in complex trauma survivors, as well as mind 
fragmentation and disturbances in memory, concentration, and sense of time. Other 
symptomatic sequelae stem from the harsh violation of the survivor’s belief systems. 
Survivors of complex trauma have a sense of being “forsaken by man and God” and 
suffer from a “debased self-image” (p. 382), leading to severe depressive symptoms. 
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Rage is often experienced, but due to coping strategies that helped the survivor tolerate 
their physical or psychological captivity, they may identify with or have sympathy for the 
perpetrator(s). Rather than recognizing their rage at those who inflicted the trauma upon 
them, survivors of complex trauma may direct their rage inward, and develop self-hatred 
and chronic suicidality (Herman, 1992). This complex array of symptomatic changes is 
presented by Herman as evidence that PTSD diagnostic criteria are too limited; she cites 
high comorbidity rates with mood and anxiety disorders to highlight the limitations of 
DSM criteria. Epidemiological research shows that high rates of comorbidity persist (e.g., 
Campbell et al., 2007; Kessler, Sonnega, Bromet, Huges, & Nelson, 1995). 
Herman (1992) described the characterological sequelae as pathological changes 
to relationships and identity. This is where Herman most clearly diverges from 
mainstream trauma theory; she describes relationship and identity difficulties that are 
currently discussed in DSM nosology only with regard to personality disorders. And 
indeed, people with personality diagnoses are more likely than the general population to 
have experienced complex trauma (Zimmerman & Mattia, 1999). Herman (1992) 
explicitly stated her concern with this “misapplication of the concept of personality 
disorder,” writing that “concepts of personality developed in ordinary circumstance are 
frequently applied to survivors, without an understanding of the deformations of 
personality which occur under conditions of coercive control” (p. 388). Herman proposed 
a number of ways through which ultimately unhealthy relationship or interpersonal 
behaviors can develop in direct response to trauma. Namely, because the chronic trauma 
occurred in an interpersonal context, in which the survivor was gradually disempowered, 
individuals with PTSD develop an intense need for attachment and an intense fear of 
attachment. Herman (1992) also theorizes that the severe identity disturbances seen in 
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survivors of complex PTSD are developed in direct response to the chronic trauma. She 
argued that the coercive control at the heart of her conceptualization of complex trauma 
systematically breaks down a victim’s structures of the self, resulting in a loss of a sense 
of one’s own humanity and/or a coherent sense of purpose. Many survivors view 
themselves as guilty, evil, or inherently wrong; this may be coped with by utilizing 
splitting strategies and identity fragmentation. 
A substantial body of work has focused on testing and advancing Herman’s 
(1992) conceptualization of complex PTSD and a spectrum or dimensional approach to 
post-traumatic stress reactions. Briere and Spinazzola (2005) reviewed this and similar 
literature and proposed the following categories of complex PTSD phenomenology: 
altered self-capacities, cognitive disturbance, mood disturbance, overdeveloped 
avoidance responses (manifested in dissociation, substance abuse, and tension reduction 
by way of avoidant coping), somatoform distress, and traditional posttraumatic stress 
(i.e., the DSM-IV-TR symptoms clusters of avoidance, hyperarousal, and intrusion). 
Beyond recognizing the phenomenology as distinct from classic PTSD, research has also 
supported differentiation between simple and complex PTSD with regard to response to 
treatment. The prognosis for individuals with complex PTSD is bleaker than for 
individuals with classic PTSD; treatment outcomes are poorer and dropout rates are high 
(Foa, Keane, & Friedman, 2000; Spinazzola, Blaustein, & Van der Kolk, 2005). Research 
has also found that for individuals with complex PTSD, treatment outcomes are predicted 
by the quality of the therapeutic relationship (Pearlman & Courtois, 2005), highlighting 
the interpersonal nature of their trauma and its impact. The phenomenon of complex 
PTSD is commonly accepted by clinicians, and a multitude of leaders in the field of 
trauma psychology have called for a complex PTSD diagnosis to be included in the 
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DSM. Most recently the committee tasked with reviewing diagnostic updates related to 
trauma in the fifth edition of the DSM reviewed a proposal for a complex PTSD 
diagnosis, as well as a proposal for a spectrum approach to post-traumatic stress 
disorders. They found the evidence for differentiating was not compelling enough to 
introduce an additional trauma-related diagnosis into the DSM-5 (Resick et al., 2012), 
namely because the constructs of complex trauma and complex PTSD were loosely-
defined and could not be operationalized efficiently enough to establish divergent validity 
from the existing PTSD diagnosis.  
Applying a complex PTSD framework to transgender systems of trauma is 
beneficial because complex PTSD symptomology is much more expansive than 
traditional DSM PTSD criteria. With complex PTSD as a guiding framework, much of 
the disparities in transgender psychopathology can be understood as trauma sequelae 
(Richmond et al., 2012). Depressive symptoms, suicidality, self-harm behavior, shame, 
interpersonal difficulties, maladaptive personality traits can arise as responses to chronic 
interpersonal trauma (Briere & Spinazzola, 2005; Herman, 1992).  
The theory’s primary limitation for our purposes is that complex PTSD did not 
originally present insidious trauma as a possible source of complex PTSD sequelae. 
Herman’s (1992) formulation discussed abuse situations that included battered women, 
abused children, prisoners, and cult members. The commonality between the survivors 
and types of trauma she referenced was that the trauma occurred in a state of 
“subordination to coercive control” (Herman, 1992, p. 378), but she did not explicitly 
envision oppression (the context of insidious trauma) as sharing this characteristic. Other 
theorists, however, have expanded the boundaries of complex trauma to include insidious 
traumata and closed this gap (e.g., Brown, 2008). Notably, psychologists whose work 
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focuses on racism as traumatic have demonstrated parallels between racist incidents and 
the interpersonal traumas that lead to complex PTSD (Bryant-Davis & Ocampo, 2005). 
Racist-incident based trauma. In their conceptualization of racist incidents as 
trauma, Bryant-Davis and Ocampo (2005) utilized McFarlane and Giorlama’s (1996) 
definition of traumatic stress: distress which “violates one’s existing way of making sense 
of self and the world” and thus leads to destabilization and/or fear (p. 485). They argued 
that racist incidents are traumatizing when they have this destabilizing effect and attack a 
person’s selfhood. They supported their argument with a careful, critical examination of 
the ways in which racist incident-based trauma parallels both rape- and domestic 
violence-based trauma, using empirical evidence to support their conclusions. Bryant-
Davis and Ocampo’s work was built upon that of Carter and Helms (2002) and Wyatt 
(1990) who noted similarities between the effects of childhood sexual abuse and racism: 
“feelings of shock, betrayal, and powerlessness, and the sense of being stigmatized as 
‘not good enough’” (Bryant-Davis & Ocampo, 2005, pp. 486-487), as well as previously 
mentioned theorists and researchers who first drew attention to the traumatic nature of 
racism (e.g., Loo et al., 2001).  
An important parallel between domestic violence and racist incidents is the 
complex duality of coming to expect the trauma but experiencing shock and 
disorganization when experiencing it. 
Survivors living with domestic violence live with the expectation that 
a violation may occur, although they are unaware of the form the 
violation will take (Jacobson & Gottmann, 1998). Similarly, many 
target group members who live with racism live with the expectation 
that racism will be felt, yet they are unsure of when the incident will 
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occur or of what type of racism they will face. Knowing neither what 
will happen nor how devastating the effects will be contributes to 
hyperarousal and anxiety. This marriage of expectancy and shock is 
unique to experiences of trauma such as domestic violence and racism. 
(Bryant-Davis & Ocampo, 2005, p. 492) 
Bryant-Davis and Ocampo explained that in addition to this hyperarousal and 
anxiety, victims experience internalized blame, as survivors of both domestic violence 
and racist incidents are told they could avoid these traumatic events if they behaved in 
certain ways. This internalized sense of responsibility (akin to Root’s unique 
vulnerability terminology) leads to a sense of powerlessness, as victims recognize that 
even when they “attempt to follow the numerous and often arbitrary rules” (Bryant-Davis 
& Ocampo, 2005, p. 492), they continue to be violated. In their exploration of the parallel 
with rape survivors, Bryant-Davis and Ocampo noted that sexual assault survivors are 
more likely to blame themselves for their trauma if they have internalized negative 
beliefs about their gender or sexuality; similarly they cited Sellers and Shelton’s (2003) 
finding that African-Americans who held negative beliefs about African-Americans were 
less able to cope with racist discrimination. Another parallel between sexual assault 
trauma and racist incident trauma is the possibility of secondary trauma due to 
identification with a target group. Awareness of potential victimization can lead to 
hypervigilance and related symptomatology among individuals who have not yet been 
directly targeted (Baranowsky, Johnson-Douglas, Williams-Keeler, & McCarrey, 1998). 
Finally, Bryant-Davis and Ocampo (2005) noted that survivors of all three traumas 
struggled with trust and relationships. 
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But neither parallel fits perfectly, which Bryant-Davis and Ocampo pointedly 
stated. The parallel with rape works best when looking at survivors of chronic sexual 
assault, as the chronicity of racist incidents is critical in understanding its impact on 
individuals. And yet chronic sexual assault and domestic violence are typically 
perpetrated by consistent parties, typically a single person, whom the victim knows. The 
accumulation of racist incidents is comprised of multiple perpetrators, many (if not the 
majority) of whom the survivor does not know. And as Bryant-Davis and Ocampo (2005) 
noted, a key piece of the trauma of racist-based incidents involves the attack on a 
person’s sense of self that results from the knowledge or perception that the trauma 
occurred due to one’s identity. This attack on sense of self (as opposed to an attack on an 
individual’s physical self) extends beyond mainstream etiological models of post-
traumatic stress and does not fit easily into parallels with other traumas.  
The work on racist incident-based trauma obviously lends a great deal to an 
understanding of anti-transgender bias-based trauma, as both are rooted in identity-based 
oppression (Richmond et al., 2012). However, experiences of anti-transgender bias differ 
from experiences of racism in meaningful ways. Though both represent attacks on the 
self in terms of one’s understanding of their worth and social value (Bryant-Davis & 
Ocampo, 2005; Richmond et al., 2012), anti-transgender bias typically also involves an 
attack on the actual validity of the transgender person’s gender identity. Transgender 
people’s identities are routinely denied, either explicitly or via the requisite of external 
validation of a transgender person’s claimed gender identity. Many transgender people’s 
coming out experiences involve having to defend the legitimacy of their identities 
(Bockting & Coleman, 2016). Transgender people are routinely told directly or exposed 
indirectly to messages that transgender people’s gender identities are not real (Mock, 
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2014). Even among supportive medical and mental health professionals, many explicitly 
require some level of assessment of a transgender person’s gender identity and/or mental 
stability before providing transition-related care (e.g., Khan, 2011). The United States 
government issued a policy in 2013 which requires that transgender people provide a 
letter from a physician certifying their gender identity and expression before they can 
apply for an accurate passport (U.S. Department of State, undated); the gender options on 
the passport are still limited to male and female, which excludes nonbinary people from 
having an accurate gender marker. Many states require proof of surgical operations 
before transgender people can update their identification documents (National Center for 
Transgender Equality, 2016), and these again are limited to male and female. Rather than 
discussing the political nature of these policies, nor debating their practical merit, these 
facts are presented to highlight that transgender people’s daily lives involve some degree 
of consistent challenging of their gender identities and their ability to define such 
identities for themselves. If transgender people interpret anti-transgender bias as attacks 
not only attacks on their worth but also on their very definition of themselves, they may 
be experiencing particularly severe attacks on their sense of self. Recognizing that 
traumatization involves the violation of “one’s existing way of making sense of self and 
the world and creates intense fear and destabilization” (McFarlane & Giorlama, 1996, p. 
485), anti-transgender bias-based insidious trauma may be particularly traumatic in ways 
beyond what was captured in Bryant-Davis and Ocampo’s (2005) work. 
Integrative summary. In this section, I have reviewed research on transgender 
people’s risk for negative mental health outcomes, as well as their exposure to anti-
transgender bias, and the adaptations of the Minority Stress Model that propose ways in 
which these are related. I have proposed following Richmond and colleagues’ (2012) 
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trauma framework as a better way of understanding transgender experiences by defining 
anti-transgender bias experiences as potentially traumatic and conceptualizing the 
documented disparities in mental health and psychological/interpersonal functioning as 
representative of trauma sequelae. To do this, I have drawn upon trauma theory from 
mainstream sources (DSM-5; conditioning theory; emotional processing theory) and 
feminist and multicultural sources (Root’s, 1992, reconstruction of trauma theory, 
including insidious trauma; complex PTSD; and racist incident-based trauma theory) and 
contextualized these within a history of trauma psychology that has routinely invalidated 
the experiences of marginalized survivors in its attempts to define trauma and trauma 
sequelae.  
The Role of Shame and Internalized Stigma in Trauma 
I have already briefly discussed shame as a piece of trauma sequelae in my review 
of modern understandings of trauma and post-traumatic stress. As I propose internalized 
transphobia is a key factor in the development of transgender people’s post-traumatic 
stress following anti-transgender bias events, I use this section to explore shame, 
internalized stigma, and their role in post-traumatic stress in greater depth.   
Conceptualizing Shame and Shame-Proneness 
Shame and shame proneness have emerged as important constructs in 
understanding the experience, development, and maintenance of post-traumatic stress. 
Shame is a self-conscious affect, intense experiences of which cause great psychological 
distress (Tangney, 1995). It is experienced in response to social threat and is considered 
an important motivator in both private and interpersonal behavior. Gilbert (1997) 
proposed distinguishing internal shame and external shame. According to this 
delineation, external shame relates to the experience of being devalued by others; people 
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with high levels of external shame believe that others view them as “inferior, inadequate, 
disgusting, or weak in some way” (Lee, Scragg, & Turner, 2001, p. 452). Internal shame 
relates to a person devaluing themselves, such that individuals with high internal shame 
view themselves as inferior and view some aspects of themselves as undesirable (Gilbert, 
2000). It should be noted that research on trauma-related shame has not supported a 
distinction between internal and external subtypes (Øktedalen, Hagtvet, Hoffart, 
Langkaas, & Smucker, 2014), and studies often evaluate shame as a one-dimensional 
construct. In their psychological literature-based concept analysis of shame, McFall and 
Johnson (2009) reported that defining attributes of shame fall into four categories: 
physical expressions of shame, including blushing, diverting eye contact, and covering 
one’s face or body; feelings of worthlessness, which include feelings of inadequacy, 
powerlessness, or being bad/wrong; low self-esteem, manifested in insecurity, poor body 
image, and self-doubt; and alienation, expressed as feeling alone, betrayed, or like an 
outcast. 
 Much of the psychological canon around shame has been based on Western and 
White cultures, but Fessler (1999, 2007) argued that shame at its core is a panhuman 
emotion. Fessler reviewed ethnographic research on shame-like emotions across different 
cultures and proposed a two-logic conceptualization of shame. Under his 
conceptualization, shame involves one or both of the following relational experiences, or 
logics: 1) recognition of one’s own inferior social status, and 2) failure to conform to 
social norms and expectations. Fessler argued that both logics resulted in the same 
behaviors, which have become identifying features of shame experiences (described 
above). Although shame is a state individuals experience discretely, shame-proneness is 
dispositional. Shame-proneness is a construct representing a person’s likelihood to 
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respond to personal transgressions with shame. The disposition of shame-proneness 
indicates that a person is likely to make self-directed attributions about perceived 
interpersonal failures (Tangney & Dearing, 2002).  
Conceptualizing Internalized Stigma 
 Internalized stigma is a belief structure that involves shame experiences. Stigma is 
routinely defined using Goffman’s (1963) conceptualization of a sense that someone has 
“an attribute that is deeply discrediting” and diminishes a person’s value in society (p. 3). 
Internalized stigma describes a person’s belief that they are tainted or less worthy 
because of an attribute that carries stigma. Ritsher, Otlingam, and Grajales (2003) defined 
internalized stigma as the “devaluation, shame, secrecy, and withdrawal triggered by 
applying negative stereotypes to oneself” (p. 3). Internalization of stigma is particularly 
high risk for people with stigmatized identities that may develop or come into the 
individual’s understanding/focus later in life. Link and Phelan (2001) illustrate this with 
the example of an individual with mental illness. Prior to developing that mental illness, 
the person was exposed to the social stigma of mental illness came to adopt negative 
beliefs about individuals with mental illness into their worldview. When such a person 
develops mental illness, they have deep-seated negative views about this attribute and 
about themselves for developing it. Research has documented similar patterns with regard 
to aging and elderly populations; individuals internalize negative views about older adults 
while they are young and then age and struggle with damaging, negative age-related 
beliefs about themselves (Levy, 2009; Levy, Slade, Murpy, & Gill, 2012). Work on 
internalized homophobia has theorized that sexual minorities are more affected by anti-
LGBTQ bias than racial minorities are affected by racist bias because the stigmatized 
identity of being lesbian, gay, bisexual, or queer is not typically shared with one’s family 
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of origin. As a result, development of self-worth around an LGBTQ identity and 
resilience to external stigma are not normal pieces of sexual minorities’ development 
(Szymanski & Balsam, 2011). Not only are LGBTQ individuals more likely to have 
internalized negative beliefs before recognizing their identity, they are also less equipped 
to build resilience to them as they develop said identity (Szymanski & Balsam, 2011). 
Additionally, non-normative sexual orientations and gender identities are sometimes 
believed to be choices made by LGBTQ individuals. Even when an LGBTQ person’s 
internal identity is acknowledged as not being within their control, there is inarguably a 
degree of control over behavioral decisions, such as engaging in non-heterosexual 
pairings/sex or expressing a non-normative gender identity. Research has found that for 
racial minorities, attribution of negative experiences to others’ prejudice about their race 
reduces the emotional impact of discrimination and increases the self-esteem of racial 
minorities, because they can attribute negative experiences to qualities outside of their 
control (e.g., Crocker & Major, 1989; McCoy & Major, 2003). For many LGBTQ 
individuals, however, attributing negative experiences to prejudice still places partial 
responsibility for their suffering on themselves. This may make LGBTQ people more 
vulnerable to internalization. Suggesting a possible disparity in internalized stigma, 
strength of transgender identity was not found to be directly related to self-esteem and 
other positive psychological outcomes (Barr et al., 2016), when the opposite has been 
found for racial minorities (McCoy & Major, 2003). 
The Role of Shame and Internalized Stigma in the Development of Post-Traumatic 
Stress  
Researchers have found robust evidence of an association between mental health 
and both experiences of shame and a disposition of shame-proneness. In their meta-
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analysis of 108 studies with 22,411 participants, Sangmoon, Thibodeau, and Jorgensen 
(2010) found a large effect size between depressive symptoms and external shame and a 
moderate effect size between depressive symptoms and internal shame. Shame has been 
found specifically to be associated with PTSD and has emerged as an empirically 
supported common feature of post-traumatic stress (APA, 2013). In recognition of this 
empirical support, the diagnostic criteria for PTSD include persistent shame experiences 
as one of the manifestations of Criterion D (negative alterations in mood and affect) 
symptoms. Shame is one of the most widely reported emotions in people diagnosed with 
PTSD (e.g., Resick & Schnicke, 1992; Reynolds & Brewin, 1999), and some individuals 
suffering from PTSD retroactively report experiences of shame rather than fear during the 
most intense moments of trauma (Grey, Holmes, & Brewin, 2001; Reynolds & Brewin, 
1999). Shame is also prominently featured in Herman (1992) and Root’s (1992) feminist 
conceptualizations of trauma and its impact, discussed earlier.  In Leskela, Deiperink, and 
Thuras’ (2002) study of former prisoners of war determined to be have been exposed to 
trauma, participants prone to shame-based negative evaluations of the self experienced 
higher levels of post-traumatic stress, with significant, moderate correlations found 
between shame-proneness and both avoidance and arousal subscales of the PTSD 
Checklist-Military for the DSM-IV (PCL; Blanchard, Jones-Alexander, Buckley, & 
Forneis, 1996), as well as the overall scale, and a significant, small relationship with the 
re-experiencing subscale.  
Though shame experiences are considered one of the consequences of trauma, 
many researchers, theorists, and clinicians believe shame to also be a critical component 
to the development and maintenance of PTSD, which would account for some of the 
association between PTSD symptoms and shame and shame-proneness. In a longitudinal 
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study of trauma survivors, shame experiences within one month of victimization 
predicted PTSD symptoms at a six-month follow-up (Andrew, Brewin, Rose, & Kirk, 
2000), providing some empirical evidence to this direction of the relationship between 
shame-proneness and PTSD development. Budden (2009) has posited a socio-emotional 
model of PTSD, in which shame mediates the relationship between traumas and post-
traumatic stress. He argued that many traumatic events, particularly interpersonal 
traumas, are effectively threats to an individual’s social self through either “(1) the 
experience of acute domination and subjugation; [or] (2) acute violation or erasure of 
norms, values, and expectations about the world” (p. 1034), and noted the parallel with 
Fessler’s two-logic construction of shame. These attacks on the social self lead to the 
peritraumatic (occurring during the trauma itself) shame experiences of helplessness and 
loss of agency and control (in acute domination) and/or exposure, rupture of identity, and 
loss of moral integrity (in acute violation or erasure of norms and expectations). These 
theorized effects align with Root’s (1992) description of the destruction of dimensions of 
security. Budden argued that shame becomes an integral part of the traumatic memory. 
Shame is then experienced with shame-related intrusive cognitions and memories of the 
event. In the language of Emotional Processing Theory, Budden (2009) proposed that 
shame is a part of the post-traumatic emotion structure and thus is activated by other 
aspects of the structure (i.e., triggers; Foa & Cahill, 2001). Additionally, survivors may 
experience shame about their post-traumatic shame experiences. As shame is a highly 
distressing emotional experience (Tangney & Dearing, 2002), fear of re-experiencing 
shame leads to hypervigilance, arousal symptoms, dissociative symptoms, and avoidance 
(Budden, 2009).   
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Lee and colleagues (2001) proposed a different etiological model of shame-based 
PTSD built upon scheme congruence theories of PTSD development. They proposed that 
following a trauma, a survivor evaluates the meaning of a traumatic event and their 
response to it using their pre-existing schemas of self, world, and others, and their 
interrelated perception of the traumatic event. When the individual interprets their trauma 
experience to convey shame-related meaning (e.g., loss of status, being devalued, sense 
of self being attacked, loss of social attractiveness), they activate congruent shame 
schemas and experience pervasive feelings of shame, leading to shame-charged intrusive 
thoughts and images. The model also offers that schema congruence (the match of 
meaning derived from the trauma and pre-existing shame schemas) strengthens those 
shame schemas, which informs later meaning-making should future traumas occur. Thus, 
this model explains the increased risk of PTSD symptoms with subsequent trauma 
experiences and in survivors of complex trauma. And importantly, Lee and colleagues 
(2001) proposed that the strengthening of shame schemas causes the survivor to 
repeatedly understand their trauma through a shame lens; further attempts to process the 
trauma then lead to increasingly high levels of shame, which evoke avoidance and 
concealment behaviors.  
This proposed role of shame in mediating avoidance is a key component to both 
Budden (2009) and Lee and colleagues’ (2001) models of post-traumatic stress. As 
reviewed earlier, avoidance is understood as both a defining feature of post-traumatic 
stress phenomenology and a developmental factor that facilitates and maintains other 
post-traumatic stress symptoms. Research has found that intense experiences of shame 
lead to what Clark and Wells (1995) described as safety behaviors: submission, desire to 
escape, hiding, and concealment (Gilbert, 2000). These responses to shame are related to 
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what theorists understand to be the social function of shame: to protect one’s self against 
social threats. Experiences of shame lead to shame-avoidance behaviors, which involve 
distancing from the shame-inducing stimuli (Schmader & Lickel, 2006). Research has 
established a relationship between shame-proneness and avoidant coping styles, with this 
relationship partially mediating the association between shame-proneness and 
psychological distress (e.g., De Rubies & Hollenstein, 2009; Whiffen & MacIntosh, 
2005).  
As internalized stigma involves or leads to shame experiences (Rischer et al., 
2003), it is not surprising that research has demonstrated that the relationship between 
internalized stigma and PTSD symptoms may also be mediated by avoidant coping.  In 
Gold, Dickstein, Marx, and Lexington’s (2009) study of lesbian sexual assault survivors, 
internalized homophobia significantly predicted PTSD symptom severity; experiential 
avoidance fully mediated this relationship. However, in a similar study of lesbian and gay 
men, researchers found that internalized homophobia and experiential avoidance 
differentially mediated the relationship between childhood physical abuse and post-
traumatic stress symptoms (Gold, Feinstein, Skidmore, & Marx, 2011).  
Shame Experienced by Transgender People and Its Role in Post-Traumatic Stress 
Internalized transphobia is the internalized stigma a transgender person carries 
related to their identity and experiences as transgender. It was defined by Hendricks and 
Testa (2012) as the internalization of negative attitudes about and prejudices against 
transgender people. Bockting (2015) stated that internalized transphobia is discomfort 
with one’s transgender identity, experience, and history, “as a result of internalizing 
society’s normative gender expectations” (p. 583). In order to measure internalized 
transphobia, it has been operationalized as shame about one’s gender identity or 
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expression (Testa et al., 2015). For example, Testa and colleagues’ (2015) eight-item 
scale measuring internalized transphobia includes statements about resentment of one’s 
gender identity or expression, embarrassment, a sense of feeling like a “freak” or outcast, 
and wishing one’s gender was “normal.” This language fits with limited qualitative 
research on transgender people’s experiences of internalized transphobia, in which 
participants discuss feeling or having felt like a “freak” (Budge, Barr, & Keller, 
unpublished; FORGE, 2005), as well as defining attributes of shame and internalized 
stigma (Rischer et al., 2003). Outside of academic literature, internalized transphobia is 
often discussed as an individual’s internal sense of things being wrong with them because 
they are transgender and/or because they violate gender norms and expectations. Author 
and transgender woman of color Janet Mock (2014) wrote of her childhood, “[my 
brother] was held as the standard of acceptable boy behavior; I grew aware of the fact 
that I negated that standard, and I internalized that on a deep level. I thought that 
something must be wrong with me…” (p. 31). Ami Kaplan (cited in Schroth, 2015), a 
transgender psychotherapist who works with transgender clients, wrote the following 
about internalized transphobia: 
Growing up in a culture where this [anti-transgender] attitude is 
common, you take it in and part of you believes it whether you want to 
or not. We learn that a certain group of people should be mocked 
before we know that we are in that group – and then we are stuck in 
the position of hating something about ourselves. (p. 311) 
Kaplan’s description echoes Link and Phelan’s (2001) description of the 
development of internalized stigma. While internalized transphobia is often discussed in 
the literature as experienced early in transition with regard to gender appearance and 
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incongruence, it can also manifest later. Transgender people who have transitioned and 
are living as their true gender identity, satisfied with their gender expression, and being 
perceived as non-transgender, can experience shame about their gender transitions, 
transgender status, and transgender history (Bockting & Coleman, 2007). Importantly, 
this aspect of internalized transphobia has not yet been captured by measures focusing on 
shame around gender identity or gender expression. 
Although the literature is lacking empirical evidence regarding the prevalence and 
severity of internalized transphobia, papers and books on psychotherapy with transgender 
clients consistently focus on this construct as a highly common and detrimental 
experience (e.g., Austin & Craig, 2015; Bockting, Knudson, & Goldberg, 2006; Lev, 
2004). Developmental models of transgender identity include shame and discomfort with 
transgender identity as consistent pieces of transgender people’s development processes 
(Bockting & Coleman, 2007; Lev, 2004; Morgan & Stevens, 2008; Morgan & Stevens, 
2012). 
The relationship between internalized transphobia and mental health has only 
recently received empirical attention. Beyond Testa and colleagues’ (2015) 
aforementioned research demonstrating an association between proximal stressors and 
psychological distress, only a handful of studies have examined internalized transphobia. 
Though few in number, the studies have consistently demonstrated that internalized 
transphobia is an important construct in understanding transgender people’s mental 
health. Internalized transphobia has been found to be associated with increased risk of 
suicidality, stress, and psychiatric symptoms (Perez-Brumer, Hatzenbuehler, Oldenburg, 
& Bockting, 2015; Sanchez & Villain, 2009; Testa, Jimenez, & Rankin, 2014). 
Qualitative work has found that in the face of trauma and other stressors, transgender 
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people employ resilience strategies specifically related to overcoming internalized 
transphobia and boosting pride and self-worth (Singh, Hays, & Watson, 2011; Singh & 
McKleroy, 2011). Hendricks and Testa’s (2012) adaptation of the Minority Stress Model 
included pride in transgender identity as a resilience factor that protects against negative 
mental health outcomes, and subsequent research demonstrated support for this 
relationship (Testa et al., 2015).  
Internalized Transphobia and PTSD 
Budden (2009) and Lee and colleagues’ (2001) models of shame-mediated PTS 
can be applied to understand the role of internalized transphobia in anti-transgender bias-
based PTS. Anti-transgender bias events act as insidious trauma (Richmond et al., 2012; 
Root, 1992), which by reminding the transgender person of their devalued status and 
challenging their self-definition meet Budden’s (2009) criteria as attacks on the social 
self. According to Budden’s theory, victims of these bias events would experience 
identity-specific shame, or internalized transphobia, during the bias event and such shame 
would become a part of the traumatic memory structure, which would lead to the 
development of PTS symptoms. Lee’s (2001) theory argues that it is not the peritraumatic 
experience of internalized transphobia that leads to PTS, but subsequent meaning-making 
about the traumatic event that activates pre-existing internalized transphobia schemas. 
For example, a transgender person understanding their discrimination as being due to 
looking like a freak would activate the shame schema of internalized transphobia. Under 
either model, internalized transphobia would mediate the relationship between bias-based 
trauma and PTS, but no known empirical work has examined this possible mediation. In 
the only study examining predictors of internalized transphobia, Testa and colleagues 
(2015) found correlations between the construct and rejection, victimization, and non-
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affirmation experiences of bias. No studies have examined internalized transphobia and 
PTS symptoms specifically, though Richmond and colleagues (2012) include internalized 
transphobia as an important consideration for therapists working with traumatized 
transgender clients. 
Summary 
The literature on transgender mental health indicates that transgender people are 
at great risk for mental health difficulties, including depression, anxiety, PTSD, and 
suicidality, and that these risks are at least partially explained by exposure to anti-
transgender bias (Bockting, Miner, Swineburne Romine, Hamilton, & Coleman, 2013; 
dickey et al., 2015; Hendricks & Testa, 2012; Shipherd et al., 2014; Testa et al., 2015). In 
their review of the existing literature on anti-transgender bias and transgender people’s 
mental health, Richmond and colleagues (2012) proposed conceptualizing anti-
transgender bias as potentially traumatizing. Defining bias experiences as trauma requires 
an expansion of mainstream definitions of post-traumatic stress that are contingent upon 
exposure to a life-threatening or sexually violent event (so-called Criterion A events, as 
the trauma events must meet the requirements delineated in Criterion A of the DSM-5 
PTSD diagnosis). For decades, camps of trauma psychologists have been calling for such 
an expansion, and research has demonstrated that non-Criterion A events are uniquely 
associated with clinically significant elevations in PTS symptoms (e.g., Carlson & 
Dalenberg, 2000; Gold et al., 2005; Long et al., 2000; Mol et al.,2005; Van Hooff, 2009). 
Psychologists tasked with updating the PTSD criteria for the DSM-5, however, rejected 
requests for Criterion A expansion or elimination (Friedman & Resik, 2014). This tension 
is part of a long history of medical, scientific, and psychological debate over determining 
the validity of trauma sequelae and their sources (Herman, 1997; Weisath, 2014). For 
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example, only in the late 1970s after intense advocacy efforts from veterans and women 
were the relationships between the symptoms of post-traumatic stress and combat and 
rape accepted by mainstream psychologists (Herman, 1997; Van der Kolk, 2007). As that 
shift in the defining and understanding of trauma was critical in veterans and sexual 
assault survivors gaining access to effective treatment and relief, understanding bias 
events as potentially traumatic would depathologize and destigmatize oppressed 
individuals who struggle with mental health and allow for the development of more 
effective mental health care (Richmond et al., 2012). As alluded to in this summary and 
explored in the literature review, conceptualizing anti-transgender bias as potentially 
traumatic for transgender people is supported by the literature. 
 While mainstream fear- and anxiety-based models of trauma and PTSD propose 
that PTS develops due to fear associated with threats to one’s physical self (e.g., Foa & 
Cahill, 2001; Foa & Kozack, 1985; Kilpatric et al., 1985), Richmond and colleagues’ 
(2012) trauma framework for transgender mental health is built upon trauma theory 
positing that perceived threats to one’s social self can elicit similar symptoms. Namely, 
Root’s (1992) construct of insidious trauma – the accumulative traumatic effect of regular 
bias events – and her feminist reconstruction of post-traumatic stress development offer a 
model of understanding trauma as the destruction of security dimensions, which can be 
physical, psychological, or interpersonal. Research establishing relationships between 
anti-LGBTQ and racist discrimination and PTS symptoms has provided empirical support 
for the construct of insidious trauma (e.g., Loo et al., 2001; Szymanski & Balsam, 2011). 
With regard to transgender populations, one known study has examined the relationship 
between discrimination and PTSD in a transgender sample; this study found that 
exposure to discrimination was significantly associated with an increase in PTS symptom 
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severity, even after controlling for Criterion A trauma exposure (Reisner et al., 2016). 
Reisner and colleagues’ study provided transgender-specific evidence for the designation 
of bias as potentially traumatic. 
Richmond and colleagues (2012) also draw upon Herman’s (1992) construct of 
Complex PTSD, a set of symptomatic and characterological changes that can develop 
following chronic interpersonal traumas (Briere & Spinazzola, 2005). There are many 
parallels between oppression-based bias experiences and chronic interpersonal traumas, 
such as domestic violence (Bryant-Davis & Ocampo, 2005), suggesting that the post-
traumatic stress resulting from bias events may include Complex PTSD symptoms 
beyond those included in PTSD diagnostic criteria (e.g., depressive symptoms, 
personality disorder symptoms). 
Both mainstream and feminist models of PTSD development recognize that PTS 
develops in part due to 1) unnecessarily extreme efforts to retain a sense of security 
following a trauma and 2) avoidance (both conscious and not) that prevents adequate 
processing of the trauma memories, responses, and/or security behaviors (Foa & Cahill, 
2001; Herman, 1992; Root, 1992). Shame may be a key piece in understanding why some 
trauma survivors engage in avoidant-based coping (Budden, 2009; Lee et al., 2001). 
Many trauma survivors report peritraumatic and post-traumatic shame experiences, and 
shame is associated with increased PTS symptom severity and as well as increased 
avoidance (e.g., Andrew et al., 2000; Leskela  et al., 2002; Resick & Schnicke, 1992; 
Reynolds & Brewin, 1999). Internalized stigma, shame experiences that result from the 
internalization of negative stereotypes about a held identity, has been found to mediate 
the relationship between bias event exposure and PTS in LGBTQ samples (Gold et al., 
2009; Gold et al., 2011). Theory thus suggests that internalized transphobia, the 
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internalized stigma specific to transgender identity, would similarly mediate the 
relationship between anti-transgender bias event exposure and PTS in a discretely 
transgender sample. This relationship has not been examined, although internalized 
transphobia is acknowledged by clinicians as a highly common and difficult struggle for 
transgender people and is associated with negative mental health outcomes (Austin & 
Craig, 2015; Bockting et al., 2006; Lev, 2004; Testa et al., 2015).  
Current Study 
Understanding how anti-transgender bias events, and particularly their chronicity 
and accumulation, are related to post-traumatic stress appropriately destigmatizes and 
depathologizes transgender people with poor mental health and facilitates better treatment 
for these individuals (Richmond et al., 2012). This understanding, however, is currently 
hindered by the dearth of research examining these variables and possible mechanisms of 
PTS development. In the current study, I examined whether anti-transgender bias 
exposure is associated with PTS symptom severity and whether this relationship is 
mediated by internalized transphobia. In my proposed model, consistent with the 
conceptual frame discussed in this chapter, anti-transgender bias experiences predict 
PTSD symptom severity after controlling for participants’ exposure to potentially 
traumatic events that they perceive to be unrelated to their transgender identity. Thus, I 
hypothesized that participants who report higher levels of exposure to anti-transgender 
bias will display more severe PTSD symptoms, and that this relationship will not be due 
to increased exposure to bias-unrelated potentially traumatic events. The model is a 
partial mediation model, with internalized transphobia as the mediator. I hypothesized 
that increased levels of internalized transphobia will explain some, but not all, of the 
relationship between anti-transgender bias exposure and PTSD symptoms. These 
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hypothesized relationships extended from the theoretical framework – reviewed in this 
chapter – of the potentially traumatic impact of anti-transgender bias on transgender 
people, and the role that shame (specifically: internalized transphobia) may play as a 
mechanism in the development of trauma sequelae related to this bias. I evaluated the 
accuracy of this model and the strengths of each relationship using structural equation 








Data Collection and Sample Demographics 
The study’s sample consisted of 575 transgender-identified adults. The number of 
participants was greater than my goal of N = 500, which was determined based on (a) 
Bentler and Chou’s (1987) 5 to 1 ratio for sample size to free parameters, which Kenny 
(2015) recommends to ensure adequate power for measuring SEM model fit and (b) 
calculations that this number of participants would provide sufficient power to detect 
parameter effect sizes of 0.2 and greater (Soper, 2016). Of note, sample was not the only 
consideration regarding the power of my model. As Wolf and colleagues (2015) noted, 
use of latent variables also increases statistical power by reducing the measurement error 
in parameter estimates. 
Participants were recruited via social networking platforms, including Tumblr, 
Reddit, Twitter, and Facebook; previous efforts using these sites to recruit transgender 
participants (Barr, Budge, & Adelson, 2016) elicited repostings and were highly 
successful recruitment tools. Additionally, the call for participants was shared via email 
with LGBTQ and transgender listservs, LGBTQ community and university centers, 
transgender support and social groups, therapists working with transgender clients, and 
contacts within the transgender community. These emails also included requests that a 
participation flier be posted in the centers/offices. Recruitment messages informed 
potential participants that inclusion criteria were that they had a gender identity that 
			 64	
differed from the sex they were assigned at birth and were at least 18 years old. 
Participation was incentivized for participants who wish to share their contact 
information; this information was taken using a separate survey and was not attached to 
any participant responses. Participants who wished to share their contact information 
were entered into a drawing for a $100 Amazon gift card. 
These recruitment efforts introduce some sampling bias, as the samples recruited 
via the Internet are inherently convenience samples (Pequegnat et al, 2007) and will be 
limited to those who have Internet access. Despite these limitations, Miner, Bockting, 
Romine, and Raman (2013) recommended the use of Internet recruitment when 
researchers are hoping to gather a broad transgender population, as the transgender (and 
other stigmatized minority populations) frequently use the Internet to connect with their 
community and Internet recruitment results in greater sample sizes. By requesting that 
LGBTQ centers and therapists post recruitment flyers in their offices, I hoped to gain 
access to transgender people who may not yet be connected with online transgender 
spaces and/or those without regular Internet access. The use of therapist-based 
recruitment introduces the potential risk of oversampling the treatment-seeking 
proportion of the transgender community, however I do not see this as a substantial risk 
to the validity of this study for two reasons: First, my primary interest in this study is not 
to capture wholly accurate or representative prevalence/severity levels of the measured 
variables, but instead to understand their relationships to each other. There is no literature 
suggesting that treatment-seeking transgender people would have different relationships 
among bias events, internalized transphobia, and PTS symptoms than non-treatment 
seeking individuals. Additionally, therapist-based recruitment represented a small portion 
of recruitment efforts and likely contributed minimally to the sample pool – my email list 
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had less than 40 clinicians, and less than five responded indicating that they would make 
the study known to clients or patients. 
Participants were asked to complete a one-time online questionnaire, including a 
demographic questionnaire and questions about gender-related discrimination, gender-
related rejection, gender-related victimization, non-affirmation, exposure to potentially 
traumatic events, internalized transphobia, and PTSD symptoms. An initial pool of 729 
individuals consented to participation. However, 111 of those did not complete any 
survey items, and an additional 27 completed only the demographics questions; these 
cases were removed. I also removed data from 16 participants who indicated that their 
age was under 18 or who did not disclose their age. 
This resulted in a final sample of 575 participants. The majority of the sample 
reported that they were female assigned at birth (72%; 27% reported being male assigned 
at birth; 1% reported being assigned intersex at birth). Participants were asked to indicate 
whether “man,” “woman,” or “nonbinary” best described their gender identity; 42% 
selected nonbinary, 36% selected man, and 22% selected woman. All participants also 
were given the option to report the gender identity labels they used for themselves. 
Participants reported a wide array of gender identities, including agender, bigender, boi, 
enby, femme, FTM, genderqueer, gender fluid, gender neutrois, MTF, nonbinary, man, 
trans feminine, trans man, trans masculine, trans woman, two-spirit, and woman. The 
mean age of participants was 31.51 (SD = 11.84), with a notably large range: 18-73. With 
regard to race and ethnicity, 81% of the sample were White, Non-Hispanic; 11% of the 
sample endorsed multiple racial and ethnic categories; 6% identified as Latinx/Hispanic; 
3% identified as Black or of African heritage; 4% identified as having Asian or Pacific 
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Islander heritage; 5% identified as Native American or First Nations; 1% identified as 
Middle Eastern. See Table 3 for full demographic information. 
Table 3 
Sample Demographics 
 Frequency Percent 
Gender Identity Category   
Nonbinary 243 42.3 
Man 206 35.8 
Woman 126 21.9 
Sex Assigned at Birth   
Female 414 72.0 
Male 155 27.0 
Intersex 6 1.0 
Race and Ethnicity   
White, Non-Hispanic 467 81.2 
Multiracial/Multiethnic 63 11.0 
Latinx/Hispanic 32 5.6 
Black 18 3.1 
Asian/Pacific Islander 20 3.5 
Native/First Islander 21 4.7 
Middle Eastern 8 1.4 
Sexuality Category   
Queer 278 48.3 
Bisexual 116 20.2 
Straight 63 11.0 
Lesbian 53 9.2 
Gay 39 6.8 
Asexual 22 3.8 
Highest Education Level   
Currently a student 217 37.7 
Did not complete high school 10 1.7 
Some college 171 29.7 
Bachelors degree 126 21.9 
Masters degree 112 19.5 
Some graduate school 44 7.7 
Associates degree 43 7.5 
High school diploma/GED 37 6.4 
Doctorate 30 5.2 
Did not complete high school 10 1.7 
Current Employment   
Employed full-time 274 47.7 
Employed part-time 146 25.4 
Unemployed, not seeking employment 92 16.0 
Unemployed, seeking employment 62 10.8 
Area of Residence   
Urban 262 45.6 
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Suburban 219 38.1 
Rural 92 16.0 
 
Measures 
In this section, I provide an overview of the measures used, with careful attention 
to the way they were scored and their psychometric properties, both in pre-existing 
research and in the current study. I attended to these factors during selection of measures 
to ensure that I could calculate reliable scores and draw valid conclusions. Note that 
descriptives (e.g., means and standard deviations) are reported in the Results chapter. 
Bias-Related Discrimination, Rejection, and Victimization  
Participants’ exposure to and experiences of anti-transgender bias was measured 
by three subscales of the Gender Minority Stress and Resilience measure (GMSR) 
developed by Testa, Habarth, Peta, Balsam, and Bockting (2014): gender-related 
discrimination (five items; sample item: “Because of my gender identity or expression, I 
have had difficulty finding a bathroom to use when I am out in public”); gender-related 
rejection (six items; sample item: “I have been rejected or distanced from family because 
of my gender identity or expression”); and gender-related victimization (five final items; 
sample item: “I have been threatened with physical harm because of my gender identity 
or expression”). For each of the subscales, participants responded to items by checking 
all that apply of the following: Never; Yes, before age 18; Yes, after age 18; Yes, in the 
past year. Thus, for each item, participants received a score between 0 and 3, which 
represented the total number of responses they selected. Testa and colleagues (2014) 
created items in these scales based on themes identified in a focus group of trans adults 
(Balsam et al., 2008), which focused on minority stress and experiences frequently 
identified in national studies of transgender and gender non-conforming people (Beemyn 
			 68	
& Rankin, 2011; Grant et al., 2010), as well as adaptations of items from the Sexual 
Minority Negative Events Scale (Goldblum, Waelde, Skinta, & Dilley, 2010). With 
regard to construct validity, Testa and colleagues’ (2014) confirmatory factor analysis of 
the measurement model for the full nine-factor GMSR yielded good model fit, χ2 (1559) 
= 5922.04, p < .001; CFI = .93; RMSEA = .06. In their sample of 855 transgender people, 
internal consistency of the three subscales in question ranged from .61 to .77. These 
values of Cronbach’s alpha are considered lower than typically is desired in scale items. 
This is to be expected to some degree in measures of bias experiences, as scale 
developers are attempting to measure a total level of exposure, and exposure to some bias 
events is not necessarily predictive of exposure to others (Testa et al., 2014). Each 
subscale produced small but statistically significant correlations with symptoms of 
depression and anxiety, and both gender-related discrimination and gender-related 
rejection were statistically significantly correlated with general life stress (Testa et al., 
2014). This provides evidence of criterion-related validity.  
In the current study, reliability of scores for these subscales was higher than in the 
prior research, with internal consistency of the subscales ranging from .70 to .81 (gender-
related discrimination: α = .70 [95% CI: .66, .74]; gender-related rejection: α = .77 [95% 
CI: .74, .80]; gender-related victimization: α = .81 [95% CI: .78, .83]). In analyses, items 
within each subscale were summed and entered as an observed indicator to the latent 
predictor (exogenous) variable of Anti-Transgender Bias Experiences. Subscale values 
for cases with any missing items on that subscale were considered missing, so as to not 
introduce measurement error. For details on missingness and how it was addressed in the 
model, see the Analytic Strategy section of this chapter. 
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Non-affirmation of gender identity. The extent to which participants 
experienced non-affirmation of their gender identity was measured with the six-item non-
affirmation of gender identity subscale from the Gender Minority Stress and Resilience 
scale (GMSR; Testa et al., 2014; sample items: “People don’t respect my gender identity 
because of my appearance or body,” “I have difficulty being perceived as my gender 
accurately”). Participants responded to each item using a 5-point Likert-type scale 
indicating agreement (0 = strongly disagree, 4 = strongly agree). Providing criterion-
related validity, Testa and colleagues (2014) found statistically significant, medium-sized 
positive correlations between this subscale and general life stress, depression symptoms, 
and anxiety symptoms. Items on this subscale demonstrated high internal consistency 
within that study’s transgender sample: α = .93. In the current study, items demonstrated 
similarly high internal consistency (α = .92 [95% CI: .91, .93]). Item scores were summed 
and originally entered as an observed indicator to the latent variable of Anti-Transgender 
Bias Experience, but, as is discussed in detail in the Results chapter, ultimately was 
entered into the final model as a stand-alone observed predictor (exogenous) variable. 
Similar to the aforementioned scales, if participants had missing data for any item on this 
subscale, I treated their overall value for Non-Affirmation as missing. 
Anti-transgender bias-unrelated Criterion A PTE exposure. Criterion A 
trauma exposure was measured with the Traumatic Life Events Questionnaire (TLEQ; 
Kubany et al., 2000). This 22-item scale assesses for the frequency of exposure to a wide 
range of potentially traumatic events, from natural disasters and motor vehicle accents to 
being a victim of intimate partner violence and having been hit, beaten up, or badly hurt 
by a stranger. Participants report the frequency of exposure to each event on a 7-point 
Likert-type scale (0 = never; 6 = more than five times). This scale is widely used and is 
			 70	
consistently found to be predictive of PTSD symptoms and diagnoses (Kubany et al., 
2000; Peirce, 2009). In their study of transgender people who were male assigned at birth 
(i.e., transgender women, individuals who cross-dress in women’s clothing, and 
nonbinary/other-identified individuals), Shipherd and colleagues (2011) adapted the 
survey such that after each item, participants reported whether or not they believed they 
had experienced the trauma because of their transgender status. This did not seem to 
disrupt the operation of the scale, as it significantly predicted PTSD symptoms. 
Additionally, lending some evidence to the validity of this modification, participants who 
reported spending more time feminine-presenting than not were more likely to attribute a 
PTE to anti-transgender bias than participations who reported spending less time 
feminine-presenting.  
In the current study, this measure was used to control for exposure to traumas that 
are perceived to be unrelated to anti-transgender bias. Thus, for each trauma item, I asked 
that participants use the 7-point Likert-scale separately for frequency of events due to 
transgender status and frequency of events unrelated to transgender status. Only the anti-
transgender bias-unrelated PTE exposure was included in the study’s model, although 
both frequencies were analyzed for the purpose of reporting the prevalence of exposure to 
trauma. Items from this adapted bias-unrelated TLEQ demonstrated sufficient internal 
consistency: α = .78 [95% CI: .76, .81]. Item scores were summed to create a scale score, 
which was entered as an observed predictor (exogenous) variable. Items from the bias-
related TLEQ also had an internal consistency of α = .78 [95% CI: .74, .80]. 
Internalized transphobia. The internalized stigma or shame that participants feel 
due to being transgender was measured with the Internalized Transphobia subscale of the 
GMSR (Testa et al., 2014). This subscale consists of eight items and originally was 
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developed by Bockting and colleagues (2014) as the Shame subscale in the Transgender 
Identity Survey. I adapted scale items to include transition history as a source of shame, 
when appropriate (sample items: “I often ask myself: Why can’t my gender identity, 
expression, or history just be normal?;” “I envy people who do not have a transition 
history or a gender identity/expression like mine”). Participants responded using a 5-point 
Likert-type scale to indicate their agreement with each statement (0 = strongly disagree; 
4 = strongly agree). Without the transition history adaptation, the scale items have 
demonstrated high internal consistency in transgender populations: α = .91 (Testa et al., 
2014). Additionally, Testa and colleagues reported a medium to large inverse correlation 
with gender-related pride, and reported medium to large, positive correlations with 
general life stress, depression symptoms, and anxiety symptoms, demonstrating good 
criterion-related validity. In the current study, items (including those adapted to include 
history) yielded a satisfactory internal consistency: α = .89 [95% CI: .87, .90]. Each item 
score was entered as an observed indicator to the latent mediator variable of Internalized 
Transphobia. 
PTSD symptoms. Symptoms of post-traumatic stress were measured with the 
PTSD Checklist for DSM-5 (PCL-5; Weathers, Litz, Keane, Palmieri, Marx, & Schnurr, 
2013), a 20-item scale assessing symptoms that correspond with DSM-5 diagnostic 
criteria for PTSD. Participants rate how much they were bothered by each symptom 
within the past month using a 5-point Likert-type scale (0 = Not at all; 4 = Extremely). 
Weathers and colleagues adapted the scale from the PTSD Checklist (PCL) developed for 
DSM-IV to address wording changes and additional symptoms included in the DSM-5 
update. Additionally, the earlier edition of the PCL had separate versions for military 
personnel (PCL-M) and civilians (PCL-C), while the PCL-5 does not. Finally, the 
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instructions of the PCL-C and PCL-M asked participants to rank the severity of 
symptoms with regard to a single traumatic event (the most distressing if they had 
experienced multiple). The version of the PCL-5 that was used in this study does not 
instruct participants to focus on a single event.  
With regard to validity, the PCL-5 has demonstrated very good convergent and 
divergent validity. Because the scale was recently developed, there remains debate about 
the factor structure of the measure. It was designed to have a four-factor structure that 
aligned with the four symptom clusters in the DSM-5; however, factor analyses have 
demonstrated that a seven-factor structure is a better fit (Armour et al., 2015; Blevins, 
Weathers, Davis, Witte, & Domino, 2015; Liu et al., 2014). Researchers have identified 
the following seven factors: re-experiencing, avoidance, negative affect, anhedonia, 
externalizing behaviors, anxious arousal, dysphoric arousal. As is discussed further in the 
Results chapter, comparative confirmatory factor analyses with data from the current 
study also indicated that the seven-factor model was the best fit. The PCL-5 has 
demonstrated high internal consistency when used in non-transgender samples (α = .94; 
Blevins et al., 2015). Although no known study has used the PCL-5 in a transgender 
sample, Shipherd and colleagues (2011) used the original PCL-C for the DSM-IV, which 
is highly correlated with the PCL-5 (Blevins et al., 2015), in their study of transgender 
people. In that study, the scale items demonstrated excellent internal consistency (α = 
.95) and was moderately correlated with Criterion A trauma exposure and strongly 
correlated with depression measures, though clearly divergent.  
Consistent with past research, PCL-5 items demonstrated very high full scale 
internal consistency in the current study (α = .96 [95% CI: .95, .97]). I entered each of the 
seven factors into the model as an observed indicator to the latent outcome (endogenous) 
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variable of PTSD Symptom Severity. Values for the observed indicators were calculated 
by summing item scores, and I handled missing data using the same approach I utilized 
for the exogenous variables: cases with any item of a factor missing were considered to 
have missing data for that factor. Again, I did this to reduce the introduction of 
measurement error. 
Analytic Strategy 
I used structural equation modeling (SEM) as the primary analytic technique for 
this study. SEM allows for the simultaneous modeling of relationships between latent, 
unobservable variables (e.g., psychological constructs) and their observed indicator 
variables (e.g., scale item scores), as well as relationships between distinct but related 
variables, both observed and latent. I selected this technique to assess the relationships 
between my latent constructs of interest: bias experiences, internalized transphobia, and 
post-traumatic stress, rather than simply the observed variables (e.g., scale scores), so my 
model accounted for some of the measurement error inherent in psychological study 
(Adelson, 2012). All SEM analyses were conducted using Mplus Diagrammer v1.31 
(Muthen & Muthen, 2015). This process is detailed later in this chapter. Demographic, 
data cleaning, and assumption checking analyses were conducted in SPSS v25.0.0. 
Data Cleaning and Assumption Checking 
In their text on statistics and ethics, Vardeman and Morris (2003) argued that “the 
validity of your results can never be greater than [your] most questionable [assumption]” 
(p. 26). Two critical pieces of accurate, reliable, and, indeed, ethical data analysis, are 
assumptions checking and data cleaning, without which researchers risk mis-estimation 
of outcomes (Osborne, 2013).  Prior to conducting analyses, I ensured data were clean 
and that extreme cases were not exerting undue influence. I designated cases as univariate 
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outliers if the absolute value of their z-scores on any observed variable were greater than 
3.0. Fourteen such cases were identified and reviewed for possible measurement error; 
each case was determined to be valid and therefore necessary to retain. To reduce 
likelihood of undue influence, however, variables with extreme cases were transformed 
using logarithm (Montgomery, Peck, & Vining, 2013); these variables were 
Discrimination, Victimization, and Unrelated TLEQ.    
Additionally, I performed assessments to check that data met the following 
assumptions for Maximum Likelihood estimation (Kline, 2011), the technique I used to 
estimate my structural equation model: independence of observations and multivariate 
normality of observed variables.  Independence of observations was met via study design: 
each observation was collected from a unique participant. This was confirmed in review 
of the data, ensuring there were no observations with duplicate values across the entire 
demographics section. Additionally, review of sample demographics indicates lack of 
clustering; for example, analyses of participants’ reported zip codes demonstrated that 
508 participants reported unique zip codes; the maximum number of participants that 
shared a zip code was 5, with only three zip codes reaching this frequency. I assessed 
each observed variable for normality using calculations of skewness and kurtosis; note 
that for variables that were transformed, I only evaluated their normality following 
transformation, as these were the values used in analyses. Data were considered non-
normally distributed if the absolute values of their skewness or kurtosis were greater than 
2.0 (Field, 2000 & 2009; Gravetter & Wallnau, 2014; Trochim & Donnelly, 2006). All 
variables demonstrated sufficient normality by this standard. 
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Additional assumptions in Structural Equation Modeling are related to correct 
specification of the model (Kline, 2011); I addressed this by using theory to guide a 
priori specification and respecifying only when justified by theory and supporting data.  
Missing Data 
Missingness was assessed for every observed variable using the Missing Value 
Analysis module in SPSS (version 25.0). Percent missing ranged from 0.7% to 10.3%. 
Little’s test was statistically significant, c2 (1084) = 1248.06, p < .001, meaning that data 
cannot be assumed to be missing completely at random (MCAR). The final scale of the 
questionnaire, the PCL-5, demonstrated the greatest proportion of missing values (9.7%-
10.3%). Because the Mplus default method for handling missing data is FIML, which 
assumes data are at least missing at random (MAR), I needed to determine as best as I 
could that data were not missing not at random (MNAR). To do this, I hypothesized that 
data would be MNAR if participants dropped out of the survey because their PTSD was 
triggered before they could complete the PCL-5, measuring their PTSD symptoms. This 
would constitute MNAR data because it would mean that the reason for missing data 
would have been captured by the missing values. The best way to assess for this scenario 
was to evaluate whether those who did not complete the PCL-5 had higher TLEQ scores, 
as previous studies have demonstrated high correlations between the TLEQ and earlier 
iterations of the PCL4 (e.g., Frazier et al., 2009). Therefore, I created a dummy code for 
missingness on any PCL-5 items and used this variable to sort participants into groups 
based on whether or not they had completed all PCL-5 items. I compared these groups’ 
																																																								
4 No known research has reported relationships between the TLEQ and version of the 
PCL-5 that I used in the current study. As discussed earlier, the previous version of the 
PCL, developed based on DSM-IV criteria is very similar to the PCL-5, and largely 
measures the same construct of post-traumatic stress, with a small number of items 
changed to reflect nuanced shifts in diagnostic criteria. 
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means on each of the other observed variables, and none of the differences were 
statistically significant; most notably, individuals who failed to complete the PCL-5 did 
not have statistically significantly higher TLEQ scores than those who did complete the 
PCL-5, t(45.36) = -1.54, p = .25, equal variances not assumed due to significant Levine’s 
test, F = 6.92, p = .01. Data were thus assumed to be MAR. 
Model Specification 
As introduced earlier, I used SEM to model structural relationships between 
variables of interest, as well as measurement relationships between latent variables and 
their observed indicators. In order to test this model, I followed the two-step procedure 
recommended by Anderson and Gerbing (1988), first establishing a measurement model 
that demonstrated adequate fit, before incorporating path analysis techniques to build and 
estimate structural paths. To determine how well the models “fit to” or represented the 
data, I reviewed three primary fit indices, as recommended by Kline (2010): the Tucker-
Lewis index (TLI), the comparative fit index (CFI), the root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA). The TLI and CFI are incremental indices which indicate how 
well the model fits the data compared to a null model. For these indices, which range 
from 0 to 1, I followed field norms and considered values greater than .90 to indicate 
adequate fit and values greater than .95 to indicate good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999; as cited 
in Adelson, 2012). The RMSEA is a parsimony-adjusted index that estimates the amount 
of error while accounting for degrees of freedom and sample size. An RMSEA value of 0 
indicates perfect fit. Again following field norms, I considered values less than .08 to 
indicate adequate fit, with values less than .05 as the ideal indicator of good fit 
(MacCallum, Browne, & Sugawara, 1996, as cited in Adelson, 2012). Additionally, I 
reported c2 fit index values. This statistic tests the significance of difference between the 
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covariance-variance matrix implied by the model and that actually found in the data, with 
an insignificant value indicating good fit. This is not often a good measure of SEM model 
fit, because it is affected by multivariate nonnormality and large numbers of parameters 
(Kline, 2010), and thus I did not consider significant c2 values to necessarily indicate 
poor fit. Finally, to compare the fit of nonnested models, I also reviewed the Akaike 
information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC), which are 
measures of relative goodness of fit, with smaller comparative values of each indicating 
better fit (Kline, 2010). Burham and Anderson (2002) demonstrated that AIC differences 
that are greater than 10 indicate that models are meaningfully different, and Raftery 
(1995) suggest that BIC differences greater than 10 provide very strong evidence 
favoring the model with smaller BIC; these were the standards by which I determined 
comparative fit. 
Specifying the measurement model involved multiple steps. Before I could build 
the full measurement model, I used SEM to compare the fit of confirmatory factor 
analyses (CFAs) of the PCL-5 to determine the measure’s factor structure. This was 
necessary because the instrument itself is relatively new and its factor structure is still 
under debate (Blevins et al., 2015). Analyses from Blevins and colleagues’ (2015) 
evaluation of factor structure were replicated, such that 4-factor, 6-factor, and 7-factor 
models were compared (see Figures 1-3). The 4-factor model included factors 
representing the four symptoms clusters in the DSM-5 diagnostic criteria: Re-
experiencing (five items), Avoidance (two items), Negative Alterations in Mood and 
Cognition (seven items), and Hyperarousal (six). In the 6-factor model, three items were 
moved from Negative Alterations in Mood and Cognition to a new factor: Anhedonia, 
and the Hyperarousal factor was divided into Dysphoric Arousal (four items) and 
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Anxious Arousal (two items). In the 7-factor model, two items from Dysphoric Arousal 
were moved to a new factor: Externalizing Behaviors. I compared the fit of these models 
using the fit statistics detailed above. As is discussed in the Results chapter, the 7-factor 
model was favored. 
 
Figure 1. 4-Factor PCL-5 Model 
 
 




Figure 3. 7-Factor PCL-5 Model 
 
 
Once the factor structure of the PCL-5 was determined, I tested the a priori 
measurement model. The a priori measurement model (Measurement Model 1; see Figure 
4) was based on the scales’ validated factor structures, including the 7-factor structure of 
the PCL-5. Potentially traumatic events perceived as unrelated to transgender identity, 
expression, or history were controlled for by including the bias-unrelated subscore of the 
TLEQ as an observed variable (Unrelated TLEQ). Anti-Transgender Bias Experiences 
was a latent variable with the four scales of non-affirmation and transgender-related 
victimization, rejection, and discrimination as its observed indicators. Internalized 
transphobia was a latent variable with each of the eight items of the internalized 
transphobia scale as its observed indicators. Post-traumatic stress (PTSD Symptom 
Severity) was a latent variable with each of its seven factors included as observed 
indicators. This model included correlations between Bias Experiences, Internalized 
Transphobia, PTSD Severity, and Unrelated TLEQ, but no structural paths were 
included, as this was purely a measurement model.  
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Figure 4. A Priori Measurement Model 
 
As is detailed in the Results chapter, I respecified this model based on evaluation 
of factor loadings and modification indices, when theoretically appropriate. Multiple 
researchers have noted that SEM is an approach for testing how well a model fits the data 
and should not be used to build a model to fit data – this can over-specify a model to the 
specific sample and damages validity (e.g., Adelson, 2012; Kline, 2010). I followed 
recommendations to only make model respecifications that can be justified theoretically. 
After respecifying the measurement model and determining it had adequate fit, I 
incorporated structural paths using Bollen’s (1988) method of first testing a saturated 
model with all possible structural paths to ensure that significant paths were not excluded 
from estimation. I then reviewed each of my hypothesized paths for statistical 
significance, to ensure that the final hybrid model only included parameters of interest. 
Although each of my hypothesized paths were statistically significant (see Results for 
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details), had they not been, I likely would have been motivated by my research questions 
to retain them in a final model. I evaluated this final hybrid model for fit according to the 
previously discussed thresholds and standards. 
Finally, I estimated the size and significance of all parameters of the final model 
using Maximum Likelihood, because all of my dependent variables were continuous and 
I met the assumption of MAR, as detailed earlier.  
Evaluating Indirect Relationships.  
In addition to the direct paths I estimated, my model included two indirect 
relationships: between Non-Affirmation and PTSD Symptom Severity and between Bias 
Experiences and PTSD Symptom Severity, both of which were hypothesized to be 
partially mediated by Internalized Transphobia. Preacher and Hayes (2008) recommend 
multiple techniques that researchers can use in order to evaluate the significance of 
indirect relationships while taking into account the nonnormal distribution of the indirect 
effect, one of which is bootstrapping. Bootstrapping involves repeatedly drawing samples 
from the full data set and estimating the indirect effect in each resampled data set. I used 
the MODEL INDIRECT and BOOTSTRAP functions in Mplus and was able to evaluate 
the size and significance of both the indirect relationships (via bootstrapping) and the 









Descriptives and Frequencies 
 It is worth highlighting some of the descriptive and frequency statistics in 
participants’ scores on the measures used in this study (See Appendix A for correlations, 
means, and standard deviations for each variable). The rates of exposure to anti-
transgender bias were incredibly high, with 92.6% reporting at least one experience of 
transgender-related discrimination, 94.2% reporting at least one experience of anti-
transgender rejection, and 78.9% reporting at least one experience of anti-transgender 
victimization. Note that these measures produced values on continuous scales, such that 
these high rates of exposure to at least one type of bias did not result in ceiling effects.  
 Participants’ total scores on the PCL-5 indicated that a large portion of the sample 
struggled with post-traumatic stress (Median = 27.00; M = 29.99, SD = 20.77). The 
National Center for PTSD (2017) recommends a preliminary cutoff of 33 for the overall 
PCL-5 score, with scores of 33 or greater representing clinically significant overall PTSD 
symptom severity. Note that possible range is 0 to 80. Nearly half (43%) of participants 
in this study had scores of 33 or greater. Because the PCL-5 was designed to evaluate the 
symptoms listed as diagnostic criteria for PTSD in the DSM-5, participant responses can 
also be used to make provisional diagnoses (National Center for PTSD, 2017). Per the 
recommended guidelines, I treated each item with a symptom severity rating of 
“Moderately” or higher as an endorsed symptom and identified participants who 
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endorsed symptoms across criterion clusters (at least one each in criteria B and C, and at 
least two each in criteria D and E). By this approach, 44.2% of participants met criteria 
for a provisional diagnosis of PTSD, with 62.8% endorsing at least one symptom of 
Criterion B, 59.9% endorsing at least one in Criterion C, 66.1% endorsing at least two in 
Criterion D, and 60.6% endorsing at least two in Criterion E.  
 Rates of exposure to potentially traumatic events (PTE) were also high, with the 
vast majority of participants (93.1%) reporting exposure to a PTE related to being 
transgender and 93% reporting exposure to a PTE unrelated to being transgender. See 





Related to Bias 
Exposure 
Unrelated to Bias 
 n % n % Natural	Disaster 9 1.67 80 32.78 MVA 4 0.74 97 18.03 Accident 7 1.30 46 8.56 Combat	trauma 4 0.70 30 5.61 Unexpected	sudden	death	of	loved	one 23 4.28 266 49.44 Robbed	or	witnessed	robbery	with	weapon 12 2.23 40 7.43 Assault	by	stranger	 80 14.84 49 9.11 Witness	assault	by	stranger 15 2.81 66 12.38 Threatened	serious	physical	harm/death 156 29.27 136 25.52 Physical	abuse	in	childhood 64 12.05 126 23.73 Witnessed	family	violence	in	childhood 18 3.39 72 13.56 Domestic	Violence 41 7.71 85 15.98 Sexual	abuse	before	age	13	(by	older	perp) 32 9.12 96 18.08 Sexual	abuse	before	age	13	(by	other	child) 24 4.51 72 13.53 Sexual	abuse	between	age	13	and	age	18 58 10.94 108 20.38 Sexual	abuse/assault	after	age	18 86 16.17 108 20.30 Stalked 71 13.32 114 21.39 Life	threatening	illness 16 3.00 268 50.28 Miscarriage 5 0.94 22 4.14 Abortion 5 0.95 11 2.09 Other 30 5.64 131 24.62 
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Building the Measurement Model 
I first compared CFAs of the 4-factor, 6-factor, and 7-factor models of the PCL-5. 
Without respecificaiton (i.e., without allowing for correlated errors), all three models 
demonstrated sufficient fit (see Table 5). The 7-factor model had the smallest AIC and 
BIC scores, the smallest RMSEA, and the greatest CFI and TLI, and thus was favored.5 
This is consistent with Blevins et al.’s (2015) findings. The 7-factor model was included 
in all subsequent analyses.  
Table 5 
Model Fit Indices for Competing Factor Structures of the PCL-5 
Model χ2 df CFI TLI RMSEA AIC BIC 
4-Factor 860.17* 166 .91 .90 .09 (.084, .096) 28738.31 29010.43 
6-Factor 626.74* 164 .94 .93 .07 (.068, .080) 28508.89 28789.52 
7-Factor 602.17* 163 .95 .94 .07 (.066, .078) 28486.32 28771.19 
 
I then tested the a priori measurement model (Measurement Model 1). This initial 
model did not demonstrate adequate fit; its fit indices fell just below or above cutoffs for 
good fit (see Table 6). The items on the Internalized Transphobia scale performed as 
expected, with all of them loading onto the latent variable of Internalized Transphobia (β 
range: 0.62-0.85). PCL-5 factors also performed as expected with β values of 0.70-0.91. 
The anti-transgender bias factors did not perform as expected, however. Discrimination, 
rejection, and victimization all loaded onto the latent variable of Bias Experiences (β = 
0.69, β = 0.83, and β = 0.74, respectively), but Non-Affirmation failed to adequately load 
(β = 0.19). 
																																																								
5 Comparisons also were made between models that had been respecified to include 
correlated errors that were indicated by a priori theoretical justification and modification 
indices with values greater than 10.0. Among the respecified models, the 7-factor model 
was still favored.  
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 To address this, I respecified Measurement Model 2 to include Non-Affirmation 
as a distinct observed exogenous variable and removed the parameter that had made it an 
indicator of Bias Experiences in Measurement Model 1. There is little literature on non-
affirmation and no known work on the ways it is similar to or different from anti-
transgender bias. However, my decision can be justified by examination of scale items, 
which indicate that the other indicator variables for Bias Experiences are measured with 
items that involve attribution judgments (X happened because of my gender identity, 
expression), while Non-Affirmation items do not. I further elaborate on the theoretical 
difference between these constructs in the Discussion chapter.  I considered removing 
Non-Affirmation in its entirety but decided that its relationships to Internalized 
Transphobia and Post-Traumatic Stress were both interesting and relevant to my study. 
This decision was based both on theory and on my data: First, lack of affirmation is a 
distressing relational experience that can be explained using the feminist and 
multicultural models of oppression-based trauma (Bryant-Davis & Ocampo, 2006; 
Richmond et al., 2012; Root, 1992). Second, my sample had a mean non-affirmation 
score of 13.38 (SD = 7.53) out of a range of 0-24, indicating that non-affirmation 
experiences may be typical for transgender folks – which is certainly consistent with 
transgender narratives (e.g., Mock, 2016). Removing the parameter between Non-
Affirmation and Bias Experiences improved model fit, such that RMSEA moved into 
adequate ranges, but other indices fell short of adequate fit levels (CFI = .89; TLI = .88; 
see Table 6).  
I next reviewed the modification indices. Before evaluating Measurement Model 
1 and 2, I had proposed a number of correlated errors that were theoretically justified. I 
examined the output to determine which of the correlated errors I had hypothesized as 
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possibly needing exceeded 10.0. I incorporated eight correlated errors into the model, 
adding correlations stepwise (prioritizing by size of modification index) until no a priori 
modification index was greater than 10.0. Measurement Model 3 includes those 
additional correlated errors. Fit indices suggested this model had good fit, and review of 
the changes to AIC and BIC suggested that the improved fit was worth the increased 
number of evaluated parameters (see Table 6).  
Table 6  
Model Fit Indices for Measurement Models 
Model χ2 df CFI TLI RMSEA AIC BIC 
Model 1 736.39* 165 .89 .88 .08 (.072, .084) 38227.73 38510.42 
Model 2 671.40* 162 .90 .89 .07 (.068, .080) 38163.11 38458.85 
Model 3 439.43* 154 .95 .93 .06 (.051, .063) 37921.01 38251.54 
*p < .001 
Note. Model 1: CFAs based on measures’ proposed factor structures; Model 2: Model 1 
with Non-Affirmation removed as indicator for latent construct of Anti-Transgender Bias 
Experiences and enter it as an observed exogenous variable; Model 3: Model 2 with 
correlated errors included. 
 
Building the Hybrid Model 
As the second step in Anderson and Gerbing’s (1988) methodology, I 
incorporated structural parameters into the final measurement model. Per Bollen’s (1989) 
method for specifying structural parameters, I first tested a saturated model to ensure that 
significant paths were not excluded from estimation. The only non-hypothesized path was 
from unrelated PTEs to Internalized Transphobia. This path was not statistically 
significant (p = .79), as hypothesized, and was not included in subsequent analyses. 
In my next analysis, I determined the fit of the overall model and tested 
hypothesized structural parameters for significance. In this model, the latent variable of 
Bias Experiences was hypothesized to predict the latent constructs of Internalized 
Transphobia and PTSD Severity, as was the observed variable of Non-Affirmation. 
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Internalized Transphobia was also hypothesized to predict PTSD Severity, and thus it 
partially mediated the relationship between Non-Affirmation and PTSD Severity and the 
relationship between Bias Experiences and PTSD Severity. Bias-Unrelated TLEQ Scores 
was a control variable hypothesized to predict PTSD Severity. Each of the proposed 
pathways was statistically significant (p < .05), and the fit indices indicated adequate to 
good overall model fit (χ2 (155) = 439.65, p < .001; CFI = .95; TLI = .93; RMSEA = .06, 
CI90 [.050, .063]. Therefore, this was my final model (see Figure 5) used to estimate 
direct and indirect parameters.  
Model Estimation 
The final model was run with a bootstrap sample draw of 1000. It demonstrated 
good fit: (χ2 (155) = 471.21, p < .001; CFI = .95; TLI = .94; RMSEA = .06, CI90 [.054, 
.066]. All hypothesized relationships were statistically significant. See Table 7 for a 
summary of parameter estimates. Both Bias Experiences and Non-Affirmation had 
statistically significant direct relationships with Internalized Transphobia (β = 0.18, p < 
.01, and β = 0.22, p < .001, respectively) and Post-Traumatic Stress Symptoms (β = 0.17, 
p < .001 and β = 0.26, p < .001, respectively). Internalized Transphobia also predicted 
PTSD Symptoms to a statistically significant degree (β = 0.21, p < .001). 
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Figure 5. Final Hybrid Model with Standardized Path Estimates 
 
Indirect relationships were also statistically significant (see Table 7 for summary). 
The indirect relationship between Bias Experiences and PTSD Symptoms was 
statistically significant (β = 0.04, p < .01). Similarly, there was a statistically significant 
indirect relationship between Non-Affirmation and PTSD Symptoms (β = 0.05, p < .01). 
Thus, the total relationship between Bias Experiences and PTSD Symptoms is small, 
statistically significant (β = 0.21, p < .001), and partially mediated by Internalized 
Transphobia (proportion of total effect mediated = 15.24%). The total relationship 
between Non-Affirmation Experiences and PTSD Symptoms is also statistically 
significant but moderate in size (β = 0.30, p < .001) and also partially mediated by 
Internalized Transphobia (proportion of total effect mediated = 15.13%). 
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As expected, the control variable of potentially traumatic events unrelated to 
transgender bias (Unrelated TLEQ) had a moderate relationship with PTSD Symptoms (β 
= 0.38, p < .001). Of note, the correlation between Unrelated TLEQ scores and Bias 
Experiences was statistically significant and moderate in size (β = 0.37, p < .001). The 
correlation between Unrelated TLEQ and Non-Affirmation was not significant (β = 0.06, 
p = .11). There was a small but statistically significant correlation between Bias 
Experiences and Non-Affirmation experiences (β = 0.17, p < .001).  
Table 7 
Model Results   
Direct Path Coefficients 
DV IV β SE 
Internalized Transphobia Non-Affirmation*** 0.22 0.04 
 Bias Experience** 0.18 0.05 
PTSD Symptoms Non-Affirmation*** 0.26 0.04 
 Bias Experience** 0.17 0.05 
 Internalized Transphobia*** 0.21 0.04 
 Unrelated TLEQ*** 0.38 0.04 
    
Indirect Path Coefficients 
DV IV β SE 
PTSD Symptoms Non-Affirmation*** 0.05 0.01 
 Bias Experience** 0.04 0.02 
    
Factor Loadings 
Latent Variable Observed Variable β SE 
Bias Experience Discrimination 0.69 0.03 
 Rejection 0.83 0.03 
 Victimization 0.75 0.03 
Internalized Transphobia IT_1 0.69 0.03 
 IT_2 0.79 0.02 
 IT_3 0.81 0.02 
 IT_4 0.75 0.02 
 IT_5 0.65 0.03 
 IT_6 0.63 0.03 
 IT_7 0.61 0.03 
 IT_8 0.61 0.03 
PTSD Symptoms PCL-5: Re-experiencing 0.88 0.01 
 PCL-5: Avoidance 0.81 0.02 
 PCL-5: Negative Affect 0.90 0.01 
 PCL-5: Anehedonia 0.76 0.02 
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 PCL-5: Externalizing Behaviors 0.69 0.03 
 PCL-5: Anxious Arousal 0.78 0.02 
 PCL-5: Dysphoric Arousal 0.77 0.02 
    
    
**p < .01. ***p < .001.   
 
R2 values for the latent endogenous variables were statistically significant. The 
model explained 41.5% of the variance in PTSD Symptom Severity (p < .001) and 9.5% 








The purpose of this study was to evaluate my hypotheses that (1) levels of 
exposure to anti-transgender bias would predict PTSD symptom severity in transgender 
adults even after controlling for trauma exposure that was not related to anti-transgender 
bias, and (2) this relationship would be partially mediated by participants’ internalized 
transphobia. Data analyses supported these hypotheses and yielded a number of important 
findings, which I discuss in this section in the context of the theoretical frameworks 
presented in Chapter 1, and with a focus on implications for theory, research, and clinical 
work. 
Difference Between Anti-Transgender Bias and Non-Affirmation 
Prior to discussing the main findings of this research, it is important to first 
theoretically differentiate between non-affirmation and anti-transgender bias experiences, 
as measured by transgender-related victimization, rejection, and discrimination. In the a 
priori model, based on the Gender Minority Stress and Resilience Scale (GMSR; Testa et 
al., 2015), non-affirmation was an indicator of the latent variable of anti-transgender bias 
experiences. However, in the current study, analyses during model respecification 
demonstrated that non-affirmation was not an adequate factor in this construct, based on 
fit indices and poor factor loadings. In lieu of this structure, final analyses in this study 
included non-affirmation as a distinct observed exogenous variable. Thus my research 
			 92	
questions shifted to consider the relationships that both anti-transgender bias experiences 
and non-affirmation had with internalized transphobia and post-traumatic stress. 
It ultimately is conceptually helpful to consider non-affirmation as distinct from 
bias experiences, and not altogether surprising that analyses differentiated between these 
measures. The items on the three bias experiences scales (transgender-related 
victimization, rejection, and discrimination) each include the phrase, “because of my 
gender identity or expression.” Consequently, participants’ perception of the role of their 
transgender identity and perception of perpetrators’ motivations are critical to their 
responses and thus overall subscale scores. Non-affirmation items, on the other hand, 
measure a participant’s current experience of having their gender identity disrespected 
and/or not recognized, and can be endorsed regardless of whether a participant would 
attribute their experiences directly to anti-transgender bias.   
In discussing the development of the non-affirmation subscale, Testa and 
colleagues (2015) noted that this experience of not having “one’s internal sense of gender 
identity…affirmed by others” (p. 66) is a minority stressor unique to transgender people 
(as opposed to other minority groups). Notably, there is a large gap in the literature with 
regard to gender affirmation, or lack thereof, and its role in transgender people’s mental 
health. Researchers examining gender minority stressors as risk factors have largely 
focused on experiences of discrimination, rejection, and victimization (e.g., bullying, 
family support). In their validation study that first introduced the scale, Testa and 
colleagues (2015) found statistically significant correlations between non-affirmation and 
perceived life stress, perceived social support, belongingness, burdensomeness, 
symptoms of depression, and symptoms of social anxiety, but no other known 
quantitative work on non-affirmation has been published.  By modeling non-affirmation 
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as a distinct predictor (exogenous) variable, the current study is the first to my knowledge 
that examines the unique relationship of these experiences to trans people’s mental health 
after controlling for anti-transgender bias experiences. 
High Rates of PTSD Symptoms and Trauma Exposure 
Before reviewing the model at the heart of my research questions, it is important 
to highlight the incredibly high rates of post-traumatic stress in my sample. Using the 
recommended cut-point for the overall measure, 46% of this sample reported clinically 
significant post-traumatic stress, and 44% of participants met criteria for a provisional 
diagnosis of PTSD based on DSM-5 symptom endorsement. The common endorsement 
of clinically significant PTSD symptoms in my sample is concerning. A prevalence rate 
of nearly 50% is incredibly high. As I discussed in my Methodology chapter, my sample 
should not be considered wholly representative of the transgender community, and thus 
the prevalence found should not be interpreted as accurate measures of the transgender 
population at large. However, they warrant examination with this limitation in mind, and 
importantly, the prevalence of PTSD in my sample is consistent with previous research 
with more diverse samples of transgender people (Reisner et al., 2016), suggesting it may 
not have been inflated by sampling. One other known study has examined post-traumatic 
stress rates in a transgender sample and found lower prevalence (Shipherd et al., 2011). 
Notably, that study used a small sample of transgender women and cross-dressing men 
that was 97% White and largely professional with higher socio-economic status 
(Shipherd et al., 2011).  Given the facts that White people were still overrepresented in 
both my sample and Reisner and colleagues’ (2016) sample, and that online samples tend 
to be underrepresentative of some of the most marginalized communities (e.g., 
homeless), it is possible that my study’s rate of clinically significant post-traumatic stress 
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is actually smaller than the prevalence found in the actual transgender community. 
However this lack of representation may be balanced by the use of some therapist-based 
recruitment efforts (discussed in Method chapter), which could have contributed to mild 
inflation of symptomatic reports in my study. 
Note that a 2013 study of adults in the U.S. (N = 2,953) estimated that 3.8% met 
DSM-5 criteria for PTSD within the six months prior to participation (Kilatprick et al., 
2013). A direct comparison with the frequency of a provisional PTSD diagnosis in the 
current sample is inappropriate, as Kilpatrick and colleagues’ prevalence rate was not 
based solely on symptom endorsement; to meet criteria, those researchers required 
participants have exposure to a Criterion A defined trauma event and functional 
impairment, neither of which were evaluated in the current study. Still, the fact that 
nearly half of my participants indicated significant post-traumatic distress is alarming and 
likely indicates a probable and stark disparity between transgender and cisgender 
populations. 
Additionally of note are the high rates of exposure to bias and potentially 
traumatic events. This is consistent with prior research (e.g., Grant et al., 2011; Reisner et 
al., 2016), and suggests that rejection, discrimination, victimization, and other traumas 
due to one’s gender identity, expression, or history are endemic in transgender 
populations. A very small minority of participants in this study denied having 
experienced any bias or other traumatic event due to their gender.  
The Roles of Anti-Transgender Bias Experiences and Non-Affirmation in PTS 
The high rates of exposure and distress make understanding relationships and 
possible mechanisms all the more important. Returning to the main findings, structural 
equation modeling yielded a number of meaningful results regarding the possible roles of 
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anti-transgender bias experiences and non-affirmation with post-traumatic stress. First, 
results demonstrated a statistically significant relationship between both anti-transgender 
bias experiences (which include the factors of transgender-related rejection, 
discrimination, and victimization) and non-affirmation and PTSD symptoms. Although 
this was partially mediated by internalized transphobia, 85% of each of the relationships 
was direct, indicating that while internalized transphobia is an important part of 
understanding how these factors relate to PTS, other mechanisms must be at play. 
These findings lend support to the conceptualization of anti-transgender bias 
experiences and non-affirmation as potentially traumatic events themselves that can 
directly contribute to the development of post-traumatic stress symptoms.  This 
interpretation is consistent with the feminist and multicultural models of trauma and post-
traumatic stress explored in Chapter 1. Bias experience and non-affirmation could be 
conceptualized as violations of various security dimensions, as outlined in Chapter 1, 
such that they may not constitute physical threat to life but do constitute threats to one’s 
sense of meaning in their own existence, sense of worth, sense of belonging, and sense of 
intimacy (or possibility of future intimacy). Similar to the ways in which racist 
experiences “violate one’s existing way of making sense of self and the world, [creating] 
intense fear and destabilization” (McFarlane & Girolama, 1996, p. 485, as quoted in 
Bryant-Davis & Ocampo, 2005), anti-transgender bias experiences and particularly non-
affirmation experiences could have similar impacts on transgender people. Additionally, 
it cannot be ignored that while not always threats of direct physical violence, experiences 
of bias can threaten livelihoods/income, shelter, medical care, et cetera, and thus can be 
experienced as violations of even physical dimensions of security. These violations of 
security (psychological, interpersonal, and physical), sense of safety, and stability could 
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explain increased risk of post-traumatic stress symptoms, which are typically considered 
to be maladaptive efforts at rebuilding safety in the aftermath of trauma (Briere & Scott, 
2015). 
A key piece of understanding of the traumagenic nature of these oppression-based 
experiences is their chronicity and cumulative impact. To illustrate this, Brown (2008) 
uses the metaphor of very small drops of acid rain falling on stone, each drop with a 
different dilution but enough that it damages and thus etches the stone over time.   
“Each drop by itself does little damage and may in fact etch the 
stone in such a way as to make it more beautiful. Thus, in some way 
the experience of daily microaggressions may evoke resilient 
coping responses. Yet each drop of emotion acid creates just 
enough damage to render the next drop more damaging. At times 
the dilution of the acid is such that the particular microaggression is 
barely perceived; at other times its sting is more apparent… Over 
time a fissure develops in the form of an emotional vulnerability 
that is invisible so long as certain aspects of the biopsychosocial 
and spiritual environment remain steady or supportive.” (104) 
Brown (2008) argues that symptoms only present “when enough acid has fallen or 
when the environment shifts sufficiently to open wide the crack.” The relatively small 
effect size of the relationships found in this study is likely due in part to my inability to 
model protective factors or the supportive environments Brown (2008) references, due to 
the need for parsimony and statistical power.  
Another way of interpreting these findings is to conceptualize anti-transgender 
bias experiences and non-affirmation as triggers. Triggers are “learned alarms” (Cahill & 
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Foa, 2001 p. 58), internal or external stimuli associated with an individual’s trauma 
memory that when experienced signal threat to the individual or cue re-experiencing 
symptoms. Regular exposure to triggering events and stressors is associated with 
difficulty recovering from symptoms of PTSD (Raio, Brignon-Perez, Goldman, & 
Phelps, 2015). Root (1992) described oppression-based experiences as insidious trauma 
that, in part due to their chronicity and cumulative nature, prevent marginalized 
individuals from forgetting their oppressed place in the world. Experiences like anti-
transgender bias events and non-affirmation may remind transgender people not only that 
they are devalued in society, but may also specifically call to memory (explicitly or 
implicitly) previous trauma and threats to safety.  
Brown (2008) described oppression-based experiences as “the small but ever-
present pulls of energy toward a survival level of consciousness, the reminders that 
someone somewhere is trying to make you and people like you less welcome on the 
planet” (p.103). Brown’s sentiment could be restated using the cognitive-behavioral 
model of Emotion Processing Theory of PTSD (Foa & Cahill, 2001): oppression-based 
experiences are stored within fear networks/emotion structures related to past traumatic 
experiences; accordingly, encounters that may hold little objective threat activate full- 
fledged threat responses associated with those past traumas. As an example, a transgender 
person might have been traumatically assaulted due to their gender identity or expression; 
years later, someone mistreating them due to their gender identity or expression (e.g., 
staring at them, using invalidating pronouns or a slur) may activate the fear network 
related to the traumatic assault. Given the ubiquity of anti-transgender bias experiences 
and non-affirmation in trans people’s lives, one can assume that trans folks are being 
constantly triggered – or, in Brown’s (2008) language, constantly pulled “toward a 
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survival level of consciousness” (p. 103). Coupled with the high rates of exposure to even 
traditionally defined potentially traumatic events, this could explain high rates of post-
traumatic distress. It is well-accepted across schools of PTSD etiology and recovery that 
one must have safety and stability in order to heal from past traumas (Briere & Scott, 
2015). 
The Mediating Role of Internalized Transphobia 
I also demonstrated that internalized transphobia is a relevant construct when 
discussing post-traumatic stress in transgender populations. Consistent with my 
hypotheses and Lee (2009) and Budden’s (2009) models of shame-based PTSD in which 
attacks on the social self activate and/or contribute to shame-based understandings of 
traumatic events, internalized transphobia partially mediated the relationships between 
anti-transgender bias experiences and non-affirmation, and symptoms of PTSD. It 
explained approximately 15% of the relationships between anti-transgender bias and non-
affirmation and post-traumatic stress. This suggests that internalized transphobia may be 
one mechanism through which these relationships operate. As discussed in Chapter 1, I 
hypothesized the significance of this partial mediation largely due to literature that 
implicates shame and internalized stigma in the avoidance of adaptive processing of 
traumatic experiences. Although I did not measure avoidance, previous research that has 
demonstrated relationships between internalized homophobia and lesbians’ PTSD 
symptom severity found experiential avoidance to be a significant mediator (Gold et al., 
2009; Gold et al., 2011). I cannot make conclusions as to the role avoidance plays in my 
sample’s symptoms, but I hypothesize that it is a major mechanism in the relationship 
found between internalized transphobia and PTSD symptom severity and worthy of 
further inquiry. It may also be that transgender people with higher levels of internalized 
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transphobia are less likely to utilize coping strategies that rely on connection to the 
transgender community as a method of avoiding triggering a sense of shame (Lee, 2001). 
This could be impactful, as an emerging body of literature proposes that connection to, 
support from, and belonging within the transgender community are key factors in trans 
people’s positive mental health outcomes (e.g., Austin & Goodman, 2017; Barr et al., 
2017; Nuttbrock et al., 2015; Pflum, Testa, Balsam, Goldblum, & Bongar, 2015). 
The significant relationship between internalized transphobia and both anti-
transgender bias experiences and non-affirmation can be understood through the process 
of internalizing external stigma (Herek, Gillis, & Cogan, 2009). Transgender people who 
experience higher levels of anti-transgender bias and non-affirmation are experiencing 
increased levels of negative messages about being transgender. This is indeed a risk 
factor for integrating these messages into one’s own worldview and view of oneself 
(Feinstein, Goldfried, & Davila, 2012). Many theorists have proposed models for 
understanding the why and how of the internalization of these messages, which in many 
ways is beyond the scope of the current study’s work and implications. It is, however, 
worth returning briefly to the Chapter 1 discussion of shame and internalized stigma in 
the aftermath of trauma: feminist models of post-traumatic stress posit that post-traumatic 
shame is related to the concept of unique vulnerability, which stated in simplified terms, 
is the idea that a person was victimized because of some set of characteristics unique to 
them (Brown, 2008; Herman, 1992; Root, 1992). Although the shame from this can 
prevent recovery, a survivor’s perspective of unique vulnerability should also be 
understood as psychologically protective because it may provide them with a way to 
make meaning out of the disorienting trauma and/or because it may offer them a sense of 
control over their likelihood to be revictimized (Herman, 1992; Root, 1992). Internalizing 
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negative messages about transgender people in the aftermath of anti-transgender bias or 
non-affirmation may protect transgender survivors against cognitive dissonance and a 
sense of lack of control, even as it increases the risk of experiencing post-traumatic stress. 
Notably the relationship between internalized transphobia and anti-transgender bias 
experiences and non-affirmation in this study was small, and there are likely many 
unmodeled factors that moderate it. 
Comparison of Non-Affirmation and Anti-Transgender Bias Experiences 
Non-affirmation had a stronger relationship with both internalized transphobia 
and PTSD symptom severity than anti-transgender experiences had. This is likely due to 
differences in measurement and the way the variables were entered into the model. In 
efforts to capture the chronicity of anti-transgender bias, psychologists who developed 
the subscales of transgender-related discrimination, victimization, and harassment 
utilized a unique set of response options: never; yes, before 18; yes, after 18; yes, in past 
year. Given that the frequency of these experiences is likely relevant to internalized 
transphobia and PTSD symptom severity, this way of scoring the measures may have 
attenuated the relationships I modeled. To illustrate, in my study a participant who 
experienced bias every day could report the same score as a person who experienced a 
bias event once in the past year. The non-affirmation measure on the other hand utilized a 
Likert-type response scale that captured the extent to which a person experienced non-
affirmation in their current lives. It is probable that if the variables were measured in 
similar ways, comparative strength of their relationships would yield different results.  
Another methodological factor that might have contributed to the differences 
found in parameter estimates is that non-affirmation was entered as an observed variable, 
while bias was entered a latent variable with the subscales of transgender-related 
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discrimination, victimization, and rejection as its observed factors. The use of a latent 
variable allows for more parsing out of measurement error that is otherwise incorporated 
into path estimation. Given the likely contribution of methodological factors in the 
differential sizes of these relationships, theoretical conclusions or hypotheses about the 
ways in which bias experiences and non-affirmation differ in the model are not 
appropriate. 
Study Limitations and Future Research Directions 
An important limitation to this study is the lack of ability to model and measure 
intersectionality. Previous research has found that when transgender people attributed 
experiences of bias to a larger number of identities/experiences (for example, if a person 
experiences bias due to being transgender, being a racial minority, and having a 
disability), they endorse greater PTSD symptom severity than transgender people who 
endorse having experienced bias due to only one of their identities or experiences 
(Reisner et al., 2016). Because I evaluated bias exclusively related to being transgender, I 
cannot use these data to evaluate the interplay of transgender identity and other sources of 
oppression. Although this study offers important contributions to the understanding of 
transgender mental health, future research will be more valuable if it can incorporate 
analysis of intersecting oppressions and/or disparities.  
Related, my sample was overrepresented by participants who identified as White 
and non-Hispanic (81%), as well as individuals who were female-assigned at birth (72%). 
It is worth considering whether the variables in this study and documented relationships 
operate differently within underrepresented groups – notably, transgender women of 
color. The fact that my findings are consistent with theory and existing literature suggests 
that they would also be found in a more representatively diverse transgender sample, but 
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future studies with better representation and research that focuses exclusively on more 
marginalized members of the community will be necessary before we can fully 
understand the validity of my conclusions for the transgender community at large.  
Additionally, there were some issues with measurement and that constitute 
limitations to the study. As discussed above, the response options for anti-transgender 
bias scales may not be the most effective way of evaluating the construct for purposes 
such as this study’s. Efforts should be made at validating alternative scoring that would 
enable differentiation by frequency or severity of these bias experiences. This would be 
particularly useful in allowing for valid conclusions regarding comparisons between anti-
transgender bias and non-affirmation. 
Finally, as is true of all cross-sectional research, results from this study cannot be 
used to draw conclusions about causality. Although theory allows us to hypothesize the 
directionality of the relationships we measured, this aspect of the model cannot be tested 
without longitudinal and/or experimental designs. Caution must be taken to not overstate 
these findings, and I encourage other researchers to develop longitudinal designs to more 
fully investigate the relationships I have identified. For example, if participants’ data 
were gathered at multiple waves, exposure to bias and/or non-affirmation at an earlier 
time point could be evaluated for its ability to predict changes in internalized transphobia 
and post-traumatic stress at later time points. 
Clinical Implications 
 By better understanding the role of bias experiences, non-affirmation, and 
internalized transphobia in trans people’s mental health, specifically post-traumatic 
stress, clinicians will be better prepared and positioned to support transgender clients’ 
psychological well-being and recovery from distress (Richmond et al., 2011; Richmond 
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et al., 2017). In this section I will offer considerations for clinical work with transgender 
populations secondary to this study’s conclusions by drawing on bodies of literature from 
the subfields of trauma treatment, gender and sexuality minority mental health, and racial 
minority mental health.  
An Important Note on Intersectionality 
As discussed in the above section on limitations, this study’s conclusions are 
limited by the model’s lack of attention to intersectional identities and experiences. 
Monolithic approaches to understanding transgender people’s mental health needs risk 
further marginalizing individuals who experience oppression and reduced access to 
resources due to factors beyond transgender identity (e.g., transgender people of color; 
Singh et al., 2017). Indeed, a transgender person is never solely a transgender person: 
they are a transgender White man who grew up in poverty, or a transfeminine 
genderqueer Latina from a middle class background, or a transgender immigrant, or a 
transgender Christian older adult, and so forth. A person’s experience of being 
transgender, and the experiences of bias, non-affirmation, and internalized transphobia 
will be shaped by their other identities, histories, and cultural contexts (Singh et al., 
2017). It must be directly mentioned again that transgender people with marginalized 
intersecting identities (e.g., transgender people of color) face increased exposure to 
trauma, including bias, have reduced access to care, and have increased risk of poor 
mental and physical health outcomes (Budge, Thai, Tebbe, & Howard, 2016; Lee, 2017; 
White Hughto, Murchison, Clark, Pachankis, & Reisner, 2016). Many efforts that have 
attempted to increase clinicians’ competence in working with gender diverse patients 
have not attended to the diversity within the population, thus decreasing the likelihood of 
applicability to the more marginalized members of the community (for example, 
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transgender people of color, transgender people with non-Christian faith backgrounds, 
transgender people with disabilities, transgender people engaging in sex work; Singh et 
al., 2017). When considering the clinical implications of this work, I ask clinicians to be 
particularly mindful of the ways that intersecting identities may affect transgender 
people’s experiences of bias and other trauma, affirmation, internalized transphobia, and 
post-traumatic stress. We as a field must also actively think about the ways marginalized 
intersecting identities and experiences may limit transgender people’s access to resources 
and/or change the way they conceptualize, engage in, and respond to mental health help-
seeking and treatment. 
Take Care to Do No Harm 
This study’s finding that both non-affirmation and experiences of anti-transgender 
bias are directly and indirectly related to the severity of post-traumatic stress suggests 
multiple opportunities for interventions that would improve transgender people’s mental 
health. The first is to reduce transgender people’s experiences of non-affirmation and 
bias, which can begin with psychologists reducing the amount we as clinicians and 
researchers perpetrate non-affirmation and anti-transgender bias. There are multiple 
ethical arguments for such attention and effort, but given the international and near-
universal commonality of the guiding principle of beneficence and nonmaleficence 
(American Psychological Association, 2017; Leach and Harbin, 1997) – considered by 
the International Union of Psychological Science (2008) to be an element of the principle 
of competent caring for the well-being of persons and peoples, I have chosen to 
particularly highlight this. Psychologists commit to have “active concern for the well-
being of individuals, families, groups, and communities” and to “tak[e] care to do no 
harm to individuals, families, groups, and communities” (International Union of 
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Psychological Psychologists, 2008; see also American Psychological Association, 2017). 
This study demonstrates that if we as clinicians expose transgender people to bias or non-
affirmation, we are increasing their risk of psychological distress – namely, post-
traumatic stress; pairing these findings with theory, I argue that in such circumstances we 
are in fact contributing to distress. Thus in order to uphold our ethical duty, and likely our 
own compassion-driven moral commitments, we must be diligent in efforts to avoid 
being perpetrators of bias or non-affirmation against the trans community, particularly 
those under our care.  
Using Psychotherapy to Facilitate Recovery from and Resilience to Bias and Non-
Affirmation 
Internalized transphobia. In addition to avoiding perpetrating acts of bias or 
non-affirmation, my findings suggest that those tasked with supporting transgender 
people’s mental health should facilitate recovery and healing from the impacts of anti-
transgender bias and non-affirmation. The mediating role of internalized transphobia 
indicates that attention to this construct and related distress in psychotherapy could be of 
benefit to clients experiencing bias-related post-traumatic stress. The literature on 
psychotherapy with transgender populations is limited, but a growing number of 
psychologists and clinician-researchers from other fields have discussed strategies for 
supporting the reduction of internalized transphobia and its impact on mental health. 
These strategies include a cognitive-behavioral model that focuses on psychoeducation 
about internalized transphobia and its origins in external stigma, as well as active 
challenging of negative thoughts about one’s transgender identity and history and/or the 
transgender community (Austin & Craig, 2015; Austin, Craig, & Alessi, 2017). 
Clinicians alternatively working from a more psychodynamic perspective may be aided 
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by McBee’s (2013) conceptualization of work targeting internalized transphobia as work 
aimed at cohesion of self. In this approach, reduction in internalized transphobia is 
achieved through exploration of fragmented and disavowed pieces of the client’s ego 
and/or history, which when done in an empathic and holding relational environment, 
allows a reconstruction of a cohesive narrative and unified sense of self (Borden, 2009; 
Fraser, 2009). Group psychotherapy is also emerging as a powerful medium for these 
interventions, as it allows for psychoeducation, self-exploration, and naming and 
challenging of internalized stigma in a context that inherently provides normalization. 
Group psychotherapy also facilitates connection to the transgender community, which 
has been consistently found to be related to better mental health in general (e.g., Barr et 
al., 2016) and decreased internalized transphobia specifically (dickey & Loewy, 2010; 
Singh et al., 2011). Relatedly, liberation psychologists promote collective action (i.e., 
activism and advocacy for and within the trans community) as a way to reduce 
internalized transphobia (Puckett & Levitt, 2015). Collective action is associated with 
lower levels of internalized transphobia, but some research has found that it is also 
related to increased experiences of anti-transgender bias and overall worse mental health 
(Breslow et al., 2015), so clinicians should be thoughtful in their encouragement of client 
involvement. 
Bias and non-affirmation. Given the relatively small mediation role of 
internalized transphobia in the relationships between anti-transgender bias, non-
affirmation, and post-traumatic stress, clinicians who do not also directly address the 
impact of client experiences of bias and non-affirmation will likely miss important 
avenues for recovery and healing. My findings support Richmond and colleagues’ (2012, 
2017) call for thorough assessment of transgender clients’ trauma histories and sequelae, 
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including evaluation of the person’s experience with bias and non-affirmation. This is 
consistent with a solidifying standard of best practice. In the sets of guidelines for 
working with transgender populations published by the American Psychological 
Association (2015) and the American Counseling Association (2009), authors call for 
specific attention to the impact of bias and stigma. Conceptualizing these experiences and 
the less often discussed experiences of non-affirmation as sources of trauma responses 
provides a helpful starting point in considering how to approach treatment that adequately 
addresses their impact. Richmond and colleagues (2012) recommend adapting models of 
trauma recovery for this work and specifically borrow from Herman’s (1992, 2015) 
three-stage model of recovery from complex post-traumatic stress, in which safety and 
stability are first established – for example, through supporting desired steps in gender 
transitions to alleviate gender dysphoria and building helpful coping and self-care 
strategies (Richmond et al., 2012); then interventions focus on remembrance and 
mourning – this could also be considered the processing phase from Foa and Cahill’s 
(2011) treatment model, discussed in Chapter 1; and finally on reconnection, which could 
involve efforts at collective action as described above (Richmond et al., 2012).  
An area of clinical literature that is particularly relevant is that of treatment for 
racism-based post-traumatic stress, within which a growing number of psychologists 
have proposed models that range from broad approaches (Bryant-Davis & Ocampo, 
2007) highlighting various treatment focuses (e.g., acknowledgment, sharing, mourning, 
anger, self-care, coping, and resistance) to more specific strategies and protocols (e.g., 
Williams, Pena, & Mier-Chairez, 2017; Williams et al., 2014). Although review of this 
literature is beyond the scope of the current study, future work adapting these models to 
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be inclusive of anti-transgender bias and non-affirmation experiences would be of great 
benefit to the transgender and gender diverse community. 
Conclusion 
In reflecting on the various pathways for understanding the relationship between 
racism and post-traumatic stress, Ippen (2012) writes that “racism may (a) place 
individuals at risk for trauma exposure, (b) exacerbate the impact of trauma and increase 
the risk of impairment, and (c) be a form of psychological trauma in itself” (p. 42). These 
three options, not mutually exclusive, offer an effective frame for the conclusions of this 
study. This data showed that within a sample of transgender adults, anti-transgender bias 
experiences and non-affirmation are clearly related to post-traumatic stress. This sample, 
which notably is over represented by white transgender men (the least marginalized racial 
and gender categories within the trans community), also endorsed high rates of trauma 
and bias exposure. Contextualized within the theoretical frames offered by cognitive-
behavioral, feminist, and multicultural models of trauma and PTSD, I conclude that anti-
transgender bias and non-affirmation may trigger trauma responses or, particularly in 
accumulation, be sources of traumatization themselves, echoing Ippen’s (2012) eloquent 
statement above. While it appears that transgender people may have increased risk of 
trauma exposure than the general population given the high rates reported in this study, 
which is absolutely critical in understanding the increased risk of PTSD within the 
population, I found that exposure to these events alone is insufficient for understanding 
the relationship with post-traumatic stress. 
In her seminal work on recovery from racist-based trauma, Thelma Bryant-Davis 
(2007) wrote that “healing requires recognition.” Indeed two central themes to the work 
of trauma therapists are bearing witness to a survivor’s story and naming trauma directly 
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(Briere & Scott, 2015; Herman, 2015; Herman & Keane, 2012). As was reviewed in 
Chapter 1, determining which types of events the field names as traumatic has been a 
contentious part of the history of trauma psychology, which has often resulted in the 
dismissal and invalidation of survivors experiencing post-traumatic stress. It is my hope 
that this study will be a part of the other narrative in the field’s history: that when 
members of marginalized communities are lifted up and listened to, their trauma is 
named, and the field adapts and progresses in response. My own transgender identity and 
history are not irrelevant to my work here. I have spent the past decade listening to my 
community’s stories of the impact of oppression, while witnessing the ways my field 
dismissed trans people’s suffering as purely pathological. As social disparities decrease 
and increasing numbers of transgender people enter the field of psychology, we will be 
carrying our community’s stories with us, and I hope you will listen. Some of these 
stories – the ones I have chosen to focus on with this study – are stories of oppression and 
marginalization. This study highlights that the field of psychology must wrestle with the 
ways in which such experiences contribute to the high rates of traumatization amongst 
transgender people, particularly those with marginalized intersecting identities, like 
transgender women of color. Recognition – bearing witness and naming the impact – is 
the necessary foundation for any next steps, whether they be individual recovery and 
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Table 8      
Variable Means      
Variable n Min Max M SD 
Discrimination 525 0.00 15.00 4.21 2.94 
Rejection 532 0.00 18.00 5.91 4.12 
Victimization 541 0.00 17.00 3.10 3.22 
Bias Total 512 0.00 49.00 13.16 8.92 
Non-Affirmation 564 0.00 24.00 13.38 7.53 
Internalized Transphobia 556 0.00 32.00 13.79 8.19 
Unrelated TLEQ 540 0.00 98.00 16.86 15.49 
PCL-5: Re-experiencing 513 0.00 20.00 6.67 5.56 
PCL-5: Avoidance 515 0.00 8.00 3.49 2.74 
PCL-5: Negative Affect 516 0.00 16.00 6.41 4.80 
PCL-5: Anhedonia 516 0.00 12.00 4.88 3.85 
PCL-5: Externalizing Behavior 516 0.00 8.00 1.94 2.08 
PCL-5: Anxious Arousal 518 0.00 8.00 2.93 2.69 
PCL-5: Dysphoric Arousal 516 0.00 8.00 3.74 2.63 
PCL-5: Total 519 0.00 80.00 29.99 20.77 
      
      
 
Table 9 
Estimated Correlation Matrix for Latent Variables 
 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Bias Experience 1.00     
2. Non-Affirmation .17* 1.00    
3. Internalized Transphobia .22* .25* 1.00   
4. Unrelated TLEQ .37* .06 .08* 1.00  
5. PTSD Symptom Severity .40* .36* .34* .48* 1.00 
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